ANDRÉS BELLO

# PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNDERSTANDING

Translated by
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INTRODUCTION
by
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Department of Cultural Affairs
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

# PREFACE

The present translation of Andrés Bello's main philosophic work represents the first English edition and as such is meant to close an important gap for the English-speaking reader in the field of Latin American philosophy. The publication of this first English edition coincides with the second centennial of Bello's birth and is part of the festivities which the Government of Venezuela and the Organization of American States have carried out to honor this greatest of Latin American thinkers.

A serious attempt was made always to follow the original Spanish text as closely as possible and thus give the meaning which Bello tried to convey, although this was not always easy. Bello's work contains a variety of typographical errors and omissions which the translator has carefully studied and corrected if simple logic required it. In several summaries at the beginning of a chapter Bello's work omits the description of the forthcoming discussion; also in some parts of the main text sentences are not complete--it seems that a part of the sentence is missing and thus difficult to understand; the translator believed the best option was faithfully to follow the original text and not to incorporate the possible description or missing part, unless such a description was obvious. It has to be borne in mind that at the time the printer worked from handwritten documents which made errors more likely than today.

To Bello's own footnotes, I have added a few notes of my own dealing with problems of translation. Also, in his work Bello uses a rather intricate system of punctuation which I have not changed in the translation, thus following it as much as the English version would permit.

I want to express my deep appreciation to Professor Oscar R. Martí, Department of Philosophy of the University of California in Los Angeles, for his valuable aid in going over the text and making many helpful suggestions and corrections. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to my wife Rona for her generous and significant aid with the translation. Finally, the translator desires to express his gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Roberto Etcheparehorda, Director of the Department of Cultural Affairs of the Organization of American States, for his interest and his encouragement in bringing about the present publication.

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# INTRODUCTION

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> If Bello had been either Scotch or French, his name would have appeared in the histories of universal philosophy. His recognition would be more than on a par with that of Dugald Stewart or Brown, Royer Collard or Jouffroy, and perhaps would be comparable to that of Thomas Reid or Cousin.
>
> JOSÉ GAOS, 1948

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## I. "Philosophy of the Understanding" in the Bibliography of Bello

Andrés Bello (1781-1865) wrote his Philosophy of the Understanding in Chile in the decade of the forties of the nineteenth century. This stage was the third and last in a natural division of his life: that of Caracas (1781-1810), that of London (1810-1829), and that of Santiago de Chile (1829-1865).

Although he set forth the first chapters of this work under the title of the "Theory of the Understanding" in 1843-1844, in the newspaper El Crepúsculo of Santiago, the rest of the work remained unpublished at his death. The University of Chile published posthumously, in 1881, the complete work with its definitive title as the first volume of Bello's Obras Completas. Father Juan Escobar Palma, a professor in the National Institute of Santiago, had charge of the preparation of the volume from manuscripts that Bello's family provided but which subsequently were lost. Father Escobar Palma also wrote the "Prologue" to this edition.

After a period of relative obscurity, this work had two prior editions in this century. One is in a 1948 volume of the collection "Biblioteca Americana" of the Fondo de Cultura Económica of Mexico. The

other appears as one of the works in Filosofía, published in 1951 as volume III of the new edition of Bello's Obras Completas. Caracas is the city where this project is being carried out. The preliminary studies of the Hispanic-Latin American scholars, José Gaos and Juan David García Bacca, have been decisive in obtaining general recognition of the work's significance in the history of philosophy written in the Spanish language.

Various problems arise with regard to the historical placement and philosophical orientation [doctrine] for the interpretation of the Philosophy of the Understanding. These problems have as their source both the process of development and publication of the initial work and the contents of its philosophy. However, the overriding initial issue is the place of its subject matter and of its evaluation within the author's bibliography.

Bello was a highly complex personality. Among his many activities, intellectual, educational, political, and other accomplishments, his work as a writer dominates. His previously noted writing on a wide range of subjects shows the wide variety of materials and interests developed in his works. Both a notable qualitative dimension and a quantitative productivity characterize his writings. When the Venezuelan edition of his Obras Completas has been carried out, it will have about twenty-five thick volumes. Each volume will carry a distinct title and will include works and essays varying greatly in length.

This monumental collection of thousands of pages and dozens of titles provides a continuing source of amazement at the knowledge and wisdom which towers above their quantity and diversity. The publication of many of these materials came during the life of Bello and under his initiative and supervision. Some of these writings passed through various editions with continuous and careful improvement by his hand. Others, published posthumously, came out within several decades following his death in the major collected editions, or on various occasions appearing in our own days. A number of these writings recently have been discovered and other pieces are yet likely to be found. Some of these materials were not published originally under his name, or they were drafts without prior publication.

None of these works, relating as they do to the man whose personality they enrich and illuminate, lacks significance. It appears unnecessary to point out that various of these writings, whether published during his life or later, are greater in importance than others. His writings were the fruit of many different circumstances, purposes, and conditions throughout a long, changing and, on occasions, uneven life. Without taking into account the work of Bello as a poet of widely varied inspirations, we can find it sufficient for our purposes to remember that in the field of prose his pen covers a highly extensive range from an essay provided for a specific occasion to a systematic treatise.

What place is fitting for the Philosophy of the Understanding in this bibliographical sphere?

Above everything else, Bello was a poet, philologist, philosopher, jurist. He also was an educator, critic, historian, and naturalist. In



addition, he was a politician, a diplomat, a statesman, and a legislator.

The whole of the above roles, with some of them taken in their maximum latitude and with obvious acceptance of subheadings (1), together with interference or superimposition, practically give complete expression to his personality and his work (2). His announcement of three trilogies does not fit a plan of symmetry. Using a sufficient degree of conventionalism without excluding other legitimate classifications in the first group, those works permit the identifying of the four cardinal points of his most speculative humanistic horizon. To this group also belong his creative and investigative writings: poetry, philology, philosophy, and law. In the second group are those works which greatly enrich and sustain the first. They express levels of teaching and dissemination, with his eminent position as an educator "of men and nations," to use the words of Rodó (3), dominating the group. In the third division are those other writings which have more direct relation to the pragmatic activities of Bello as a public figure.

Our four cardinal points of the major writings of Bello guide in a natural way similar to the manner in which geographical boundaries determine their basic divisions. Although the issue in itself is debatable, it is fitting, at the time of the bicentennial of Bello's birth, to understand, defined by the most consistent critical traditions, the primary titles of the works expressive of these four trends. In chronological order of their appearance, these works are as follows: Alocución a la Poesía, 1823; La Agricultura de la Zona Tórrida, 1826; Principios de Derecho Internacional, 1832; Principios de Ortología y Métrica de la Lengua Castellana, 1835; Análisis Ideológica de los Tiempos de la Conjugación Castellana, 1841; Discurso en la Instalación de la Universidad de Chile, 1843; Gramática de la Lengua Castellana, 1847; Código Civil, 1856; Filosofía del Entendimiento, 1881 (4).

Other works can be worthy of the level accorded to the above materials. Included in such a group would be any other poetry or various extensive drafts of poetry together with such other philological, critical or pedagogical studies that can be appreciated intrinsically (5). But none of these latter works would serve in any situation as replacements for these works irrespective of the degree to which the list properly might permit any completion. Although it would be easy to mention here many other possible works, it would not contribute to our purpose. What has been attempted is only to determine those works, however worthy some of his other works may be, through which Bello came to be recognized as a classic of letters and of thought in the Spanish language.

In identifying on a higher level the most representative works, based on their artistic originality or theoretical significance within the four fields preferred by Bello, the choice also is made, tacitly if not expressly, by the same critical tradition. These works are La Agricultura de la Zona Tórrida, Principios de Derecho Internacional, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana, and Filosofía del Entendimiento.

Focusing on Bello's four primary works has various consequences. In the first place, it serves as a point of orientation for such a great and complete production. In the second place, it provides an interpretive guide line for its truly central nucleus, with all the light which

this throws over its profound meaning. In the third place, it has use as a criterion for the internal rational placement of the Philosophy of the Understanding in the framework of the entire bibliography of Bello.

In 1881 Miguel Antonio Caro wrote: "When the progressive advances of science and a more perfected system of laws have obscured the works to which Bello dedicated most of his life as a philologist and a jurist, the one who sings of the tropical zone yet will live in the most remote posterity" (6). This judgment, which now is classic, mentions only three of the master's four outstanding emphases which we have been considering. The reason for this omission is that Bello's philosophical treatise still was unknown at that time. It was pointed out that, with the exception of the much earlier appearance of some chapters in a newspaper, the complete treatise was published only in 1881. But by 1893 Menéndez y Pelayo, although conceding that "Bello's verses are certain to become works that will have unassailable worth," begins his analysis of Bello's intellectual personality within the framework of a philosopher. Regarding the posthumous work of 1881, Menéndez y Pelayo said that "it is without doubt the most important work of its kind in American literature" (7). Although this last judgment now has become dated, it is no less certain that in 1948, when the work was placed in even wider cultural areas, José Gaos assigned it the following position:

> The place given in his system to the Philosophy of the Understanding both in general and in details attests to the value of this work. It not only is exceptional in the history of thought in the Spanish language, but it also occupies not a small place in the universal language of philosophy (8).

The above signifies that the privileged position of the Philosophy of the Understanding continues to be justified among the limited number of those works that, however rigorous the scrutiny may be, the work always will remain one of the most significant in the bibliographical collection of Bello.

An important complement of the philosophical part of this collection is the already cited Discurso en la Instalación de la Universidad de Chile because of its concerns with the philosophy of education, sciences, and culture. Moreover, it is complemented by various minor writings of critical comment or translations published between 1827 and 1849 (9). Bello wrote most of these materials in the decade of the forties during the time that he also was preparing the treatise. This decade became a period of major activity for Bello, who already was in his sixties, in the written expression of his philosophy. After reviewing these works, and particularly those in the initial chapters of the treatise of 1843-1844 proceeding to Bello's last article about Rattier of 1848-1849, Carlos Bacca arrives at the well-founded conclusion that "by these dates Bello already had a perfect conception, if not yet fully in written form, of his Philosophy of the Understanding" (10).

It also is essential to add important philosophical elements found in the following two grammatical works which also were published in the same decade: Análisis Ideológica de los Tiempos de la Conjugación Castellana and Gramática de la Lengua Castellana. The philosophical elements of these works are not foreign, on the other hand, to the same



basic reflection about the human understanding, so central in the relations between language and thought, or, in other words, between language and understanding.

This mutual support found in his views about language and thought was the result of the close understanding between Bello the philologist and Bello the philosopher. Although one interest is completely separate from the other in various areas of each field, still there is a common ground in which the two come together and become one. This area has a decisive role. Without the philosopher, fundamental features of the philologist would not be explained; without the philologist, features of the philosopher no less fundamental would be unexplained. His philology and his philosophy each unfold in its own sphere. They respond in their spirit to independent inclinations which appeal to different methodologies and systematizations. However, both of these interests not only continued in a consistent parallelism from the days of Caracas throughout his life, but they also became interlocked in deep strata in which his philosophy and his philology nourish each other (11).

The leading role which philosophical thought carries out in this relation through its own features is a natural one. However didactic might be his purpose and however declared his intention to lessen his dependence on philosophy, Bello's development of his grammar, explicitly or implicitly, receives inspirations, if not its bases, from his philosophical orientation or ideas of the most speculative order. The relation between thought and language so obsessive among successive generations of philosophers in this century was also a characteristic interest of Bello. With Condillac in the background as a point of arrival as much as a point of departure, Bello perhaps more than any predecessor regarded grammar as inseparable both from logic and from psychology; at the same time, he closely linked both of them to basic philosophy. Without prejudice of unduly shading the course of Bello's personal development, he was representative of that sign of the times. And even though there was in his primary writing the trait of expression of previous generations, this feature only places his work closer to similar problems and attitudes in which the modality of our days links philosophy and language together.

Leaving aside for the moment the philosophical basis of his juridical views, it would not be possible to understand the poet in his most majestic expressions without taking into account the epochal spirit of his philosophical analysis, to which, like the stamp of a die, his Philosophy of the Understanding contributed. In 1823, the same year in which the first of his great Silvas appeared, he wrote:

> Philosophical poems, decorated with the embellishments of the lyrical language, and especially in silvas, hendecasyllabic romances, or blank verse, form a very considerable part of the modern Spanish Parnassus. Various factors which have contributed to placing them in vogue include the habit of discussion and analysis which has overpowered the understanding and the desire for reform which has agitated all societies and called general attention to moral and political themes [. . .]. Many censure this tendency which they call a craze for philosophizing poetically and of writing sermons in verse. But we [. . .] believe that the question boils down to whether this

kind of poetry is, or is not, capable of interesting and entertaining us (12).

In historical perspective, the characterization which Menéndez y Pelayo made in his quoted judgment of 1893 of the native of Caracas takes on a significance more and more precise:

> [It is] comparable in some ways to those patriarchs who in the classical myth of primitive societies are presented to us both as philosophers and poets luring men with the enticements of harmony in order to induce them to conform into culture and social life. And, at the same time, they were raising the walls of the cities and writing on imperishable tablets the sacred precepts of the law (13).

## II. Historico-Doctrinal Relationship of the "Philosophy of the Understanding"

Nothing is more illustrative as the first guiding thread for the historico-doctrinal placing of the philosophical treatise of Bello than its very title, the Philosophy of the Understanding. However great its own internal variations might have been, its mere title refers us automatically to a definite period of modern philosophy and to a current in it no less defined in its subject matter and in its orientation.

When the work had its long-delayed posthumous publication in 1881, during the full reign of positivism, that earlier period and that intellectual movement historically were ending. Yet it was not this way when the work was undertaken and, in its essentials, finished in the decade of the 1840's. However, at that time it found itself in its latest phase, which basically was one of survival. As a period, it extends from the end of the seventeenth century, culminates with the Enlightenments, and continues as late as the first half of the nineteenth century. It encompasses within its scope the modern transition which gave the theory of knowledge great priority over ontology. As a movement during this period, it dealt in a national sense with epistemological views originating in English sources. In a doctrinal sense, these positions held to analytic-psychological-empirical foundations. Each of these characteristics, that of national origin and of philosophical views, were clearly of distinct traits, although the first would experience further growth and the latter attenuations.

The above movement was only one of the great directions of critical reflection, more so than systematic, dominant in the period. But more than any other, this movement had enormous historical significance, apart from philosophy in itself, because of its links with the great educational, religious, and political transformations which occurred at that time in Europe and America. Moreover, if in considering its most speculative features a name would be sought which would characterize what was most appropriate for that period, perhaps no better one could be found than the precise title of Bello's work. As a part of the burgeoning philosophy of knowledge of that period, it was par excellence, in the manner of a species within its genus, a "philosophy of the understanding." As a philosophy, it made of the understanding, through a special conception of itself, its own favored object.



The 1689 Essay Concerning Human Understanding of Locke is the classical matrix title of all of the movement. A century and a half later, the Philosophy of the Understanding of Bello is probably the last. It is not by accident that the expression "understanding" then disappeared from the titles of books about this subject. At the same time, there was a change in preferred philosophical interests even among epistemologists. Yet, through other channels, a certain form of its reappearance is taking place in our time.

Diverse circumstances came together in a sector of thought at a certain plateau of the modern period to convert this philosophy of understanding into a kind of philosophia prima [first philosophy]. First of all, of course, was the well-known dominance of epistemological topics at the expense of those in ontology. But there is something more in the resultant terminological preference. In the passage which comparably comes about in the replacement of Latin by national philosophical languages, militant empiricism opted for making the word "understanding" the principal inheritor of the old "intellectus." This option included more than the expressions of "intellect," "intelligence," or "reason," which also were used in special instances. It took in the perspection of the sensory order the same cognitive faculty in addition to the discursive activity of a logical character. In the same way, the common word "idea" was extended also to include concept, percept, and even sensation. It is with this extension that the word enters into the expression "association of ideas," an expression typical of the characteristic psychological associationism which also was a part of the same historical movement.

With the expression "understanding" established in leadership (in the influential English version), it tended to constitute by itself an intrinsic characterization of empiricism and, at the same time, of psychologism and sensationism in the problem of knowledge. With more precision, "understanding" referred to the origin of knowledge, or, with even greater precision, to the origin of ideas since there was an inclination to mention this notion which then became central. After Locke's work, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, along with others developed or enriched this direction of thought, although each case had different motivations and intonations.

On the rationalistic side Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, each one in his way, emphasized the distinction between sensibility (in the sense of the sensory) and understanding (in the meaning of logical activity). In this manner, the first was separated naturally from the second, and not through an extension of linguistic meaning. They were restoring to this distinction all of its scope in the traditional contrast between the senses and intellect. In an extension of these differences, Kant in his turn would enlarge the distinction toward the other extreme, differentiating among the three levels of sensibility, understanding, and reason, and making a hierarchy of them. From the psychological analysis of the understanding, with its wide grammatical-linguistic implications, he proceeds in this way to the logical-transcendental critique of the reason. To construct this latter view, he uses the notion of hegemony in place of the understanding, with increasingly greater estrangement from philological disquisitions.

At the same time, a concurrent reaction was taking place in Scotland

in the name of a philosophy of "common sense" against the doctrinaire primacy of the understanding in the Lockean manner. Even in the very camp of knowledge, this philosophy sought to be above everything else a philosophy "of the spirit." It is the notion of spirit which, without renouncing the empiricist and psychologist relationships, rises here to the highest level. Although this notion establishes itself in the major titles of the school from Reid, through Stewart, to Brown, its basic meaning will be essentially psychological. Bello himself points out it in passing with a certain emphasis: "The psychological method always has been known in philosophy; neither is it possible to have philosophy without it. Locke, Berkeley, Reid, Dugald Stewart saw the perceptions of conscience as a source of all knowledge which the soul can have of itself" (14). However, undoubtedly the insistance on the expression "spirit," because of its sole potentialities, was to open new roads to the recovery of metaphysics. From the beginning of the second half of the eighteenth century, it is on this highest level from which Scottish philosophy would advance. The notions of spirit, with other projections, would continue in subsequent German post-Kantian idealism and in eclectic French spiritualism. Even at the height of the nineteenth century, these tendencies blocked the "philosophy of the understanding" in its expressed classic modern sense.

The Philosophy of the Understanding belongs to this final phase, or, with more accuracy, to this phase of the preceding generations. From his youthful initiation in Caracas, Bello had accepted its spirit through the reading of Locke and Condillac in addition to his initial scholastic courses. Before approaching the postponed writing of the work in the decade of the 1840's, Bello comments in London, in 1827, about the Spanish translation of an analytic abstract of the Elements of Ideology of Destutt de Tracy:

> Certainly, there is missing an elemental work of ideology and the best way to fill this gap would be to adapt in a treatise of moderate length what the writings of Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, Cabanis, Degerando, Reid, Dugald Stewart, and other modern philosophers present as truly useful. Neither should be forgotten in such a treatise the writings of Locke, Malebranche, Berkeley since their successors have not known always how to make good use of their primary discoveries. This kind of work is lacking not only in Spain, but also in France and in England itself, to which the science of the understanding owes so much (15).

The underlining in the above passage is ours. It appeared useful to us in order to interpret the passage better. There is need to bear clearly in mind that the philosophy of the understanding, or theory of the understanding, or science of the understanding--the three forms Bello uses with the same scope, not only in different periods but also in his own treatise (16)--had become "ideology" in the epistemological meaning of "science of ideas" for the school of Destutt de Tracy, whose followers also continued to be influenced by Condillac's views into the first decades of the nineteenth century. Without regard in any way as a formal supporter of this school, Bello handles the expressions "ideology" and "science of the understanding" as equivalences, in accord with the best usage of that period.



Living in Chile since 1829, Bello took advantage more and more of teaching opportunities in the field of philosophy. He intensified his relationships not only with the philosophers already mentioned in London, but also with others who more recently entered this field. Among these were Victor Cousin and Theodore Jouffroy, the principal representatives of the emergent eclectic French spiritualism. Particularly through Cousin, whom in 1845 he calls "the first among the philosophers of our days" (17), he acquired indirect knowledge of the thought of Kant. And with great probability, it was through this source that he became acquainted with the philosophy of Leibnis. The previously mentioned contemporary French spiritualist, the classical German philosophers whose views they spread, and the Scottish views which equally were disseminated with great enthusiasm brought about a fundamental change of historical climate. Yet even the above situation does not take into account the still younger philosophers like John Stuart Mill and Balmes, who provided the older Bello, with his late awareness of them, with another set of problems. This change contributed to polish up many edges of the later formation of the native of Caracas, converting him into a kind of very independent critic of the current dominant eclecticism. Obviously, in his case, there also was a marked spiritualist emphasis.

No other meaning can be derived from the words which in 1843 introduced the newspaper publication of the first chapter of his treatise:

> Among the problems which are presented to the understanding in the examination of such an arduous and impressive material are many things about which the various schools still are in disagreement. We do not fly under the banner of any of them. Perhaps if we study their doctrines, we find that the divergence is more on the surface than in more basic matters, and if they are reduced to their most simple expression, it is not difficult to reconcile most of them. When such reconciliations are not possible, we at least can condense the boundaries of the disputes to narrower limits which, up to a certain point, diminish the significance of these differences and place the most valuable scientific advancements under the guarantee of a universal assent (18).

Notwithstanding this frankly eclectic tone and the consequent reduction of the object of philosophy to "the knowledge of the human spirit and the right direction of its acts" (19), all of these passages are in harmony with the vocabulary most in vogue in those new times. He was presenting those chapters as a theory "of the understanding" and the treatise itself as a philosophy "of the understanding." The contents of the material in its basic elements and in its systematic distribution justify his use of the title of the work. Although Bello did not belong to any school in the usual sense, an essential fidelity to the defined philosophical tradition will dominate all his labor.

The fidelity begins to manifest itself in the point of departure. It has as its base the psychological dualism of understanding and will. At this date, this dualism was eroded greatly by other ways which were in step either with the ascending status of sentiment in the broad sense or with the affective life as a separate and distinct category. This dualism had been very dominant in scholasticism through the antithesis of "intellectus" and "voluntas," which, for example, played an important

role in the theological disputes between the Thomists and the Scotists. Frequently, the significance of these disputes are not understood because of the omission of the fideista importance of the notion of love, which at the time was included in the notion of the will.

In the modern period, the initial empiricism of traditional schools accepted that old dualism in the expressed terms of the understanding and the will as basic to all their progress. There is a difference with classical rationalism which also participated for a long time in the same imminent dualism of the psychic life. Its adherents were inclined to use the word "reason" instead of "understanding." When the rationalists have recourse to this accessory, as they do not cease to have, they become concerned to identify reason with the logical function. This identification might be by adding "pure" to qualify "reason," or by setting apart in an explicit way the sensory perception which the empiricists, in contrast, were insisting on subsuming under their own notion of understanding.

Locke was establishing that, "The two great and principal Actions of the Mind [. . .] are these two: Perception, or Thinking, and Volition, or Willing. The Power of Thinking is called the Understanding, and the Power of Volition is called the Will [. . .]" (20). And on his part, Berkeley stated that, "A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will" (21). It was in this theoretical line that Bello wrote, in the Introduction of his treatise, that, "As a consequence, the soul has powers or faculties of two classes. By one group, we know; by the other, we crave. The joining of the first is called mind, understanding, intelligence, and the joining of the second, will" (22).

The native of Caracas concluded that, "Mental Psychology and Logic make up the Philosophy of the Understanding; Moral Psychology and Ethics [the subject of which is the will in its course of action and in its direction] make up Moral Philosophy" (23). With these two branches of philosophy conceived in this way and with each one corresponding to those two traditional divisions of the psychic life, only the Mental Psychology and Logic would constitute the object of his treatise. As a consequence, he divided his treatise into two primary parts, Mental Psychology and Logic. (Yet let us observe that in spite of this initial restriction and without speaking of his other writings, Bello goes beyond mental or representative psychology more than once in his treatise to branch out into volitional or active psychology, just as he also touched on diverse ontological and normative points of ethics in the same treatise.)

Although Bello had this attachment to classical psychological dualism, he also held that the affections or the sentiments in their broadest sense were struggling for proper recognition in the psychic life. The ambiguity of the verb to feel, applicable both to sensations and to sentiments, partly was standing in the way of such recognition from the order of the understanding. On the other hand, from the order of the will, the additional ambiguity of the verb to want applies both to voluntary decision and to affective disposition. This recognition culminates in the core of French eclectic spiritualism, which developed its views from various sources. After that time, a tripartite view became



accepted instead of the exhausted dichotomy between understanding and will. In the new view, each one of the older expressions "to feel" and "to want" contributed with its share in the shaping of the third, or psychic life.

It would be very difficult to find another passage of that period and school which better summarizes such an outcome on the dialectic level than the following quotation from the historic 1843 Psychology of Amadeo Jacques, who practically was a contemporary of Bello, with everything that this fact signifies for the characterization and placement of this material:

> Under their diverse forms, our thoughts constitute a class of human phenomena. Our sentiments, each one adapted to its object, constitute another. And a third consists of all our voluntary relations. All the acts of conscience enter into this classification. In this way, there are three primary functions of the psychological life, three and no more than three principal faculties of the human soul, the intelligence [understanding], the sensibility [here, in the sense of the affective], and the will. These occupy all life with the inexhaustible fecundity of its developments. And their different products, associated and combined in various ways, are those which make up the texture, which are at the same time both uniform and varied, of all human existence (24).

Of course, Bello did not pass over the affective phenomena. But he mentioned them only in passing and referred them to the understanding in the sphere of what he called "internal sensitive perceptions," concerning different parts of the organism: "These complex phenomena tend to be called emotions, sentiments, feelings, passions, such as happiness, sadness, anger, fear, tenderness, aversion, pity, horror, admiration, shame, and various others." Opposing the multiplicity of the varied uses of the verb to feel, which in his judgment ought to be limited to external or internal sensitive perceptions, he further added that, "One feels the death of a beloved person; one feels sympathy with the sufferings of others; one feels horror, aversion, sadness, happiness. Yet all of these phases are psychologically inexact" (25).

The tripartite notions of faculties, of actions, of functions, or of the psychic phenomena depending upon whether one wants to classify in accord with conceptual preferences more so than terminological preferences, were also destined to a long and, at the same time, generalized validity in later psychology. The fact that Bello would not reach an agreement about the above matter is an additional proof of the relevance of his work to what already was the latter phases of our interpretation of the modern movement of "the philosophy of the understanding." It serves to establish with a greater degree of approximation the historical framework and the doctrinal bonds to which this work corresponds.

It is unnecessary to explain that nothing regarding what has been said affects permanent interest in this work as a classical text since it is so close to many other major or minor European writings in this movement which we have been discussing. This is all the more the situation since it constitutes a privileged nucleus of Bello's philosophical work, which focuses on the analysis of the relation between understanding

and language, between thought and language. This, then, also is a primary concern in the analytic-linguistic tendencies of contemporary philosophy which has some of its various roots in the philosophy of the Enlightenment.

## III. Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Bello

The Philosophy of the Understanding, as we have seen, is the object of only one of the two major branches of philosophy, in the view of Bello. The other branch is Moral Philosophy, which he places outside the plan of this work. The work on the understanding has two primary subdivisions which are Mental Psychology and Logic.

As the first of these two parts, Mental Psychology is the most extense and also the most substantive, although it excludes in expressed form what the author calls "moral psychology," which consists in the psychological study of the operations and acts of the will. Yet this exclusion, according to what we already have advanced, does not remain absolute. Bello sets forth twenty-two chapters about this truncated psychology in accordance, at least theoretically, with his original plan, while he provides only eight chapters for logic. The most decisive part of the work is the conceptual meaning of the subject matter of psychology and the way he brings together doctrines which integrate it. In this respect, he examines questions which go from the sensation to major questions of primary philosophy. When Bello's psychology focuses only on mental psychology or the psychology of the understanding, it is fundamentally a metaphysical psychology. But he does not permit his logic to be primarily a metaphysical undertaking.

Since the subject matter of psychology, or at least a part of it, was still far from being accepted as a positive science, Bello's view of it was not unusual for that period. It is clear that the general movement of the "philosophy of the understanding" belonged to the long cycle of metaphysical decline associated with the ascendancy of the problem of knowledge to the highest level of philosophical interest. In spite of the dominance of epistemological interests and even of the essential psychologism which served it as a base, not only did this movement not separate itself from ontology but, with the reservation of a radical skepticism which had Hume as its model, it was from ontology that in its way it brought out its most definitive features. The running down of metaphysics which historically is accepted as a trait of this period existed primarily applied to the traditional metaphysics characteristic of the a prioristic speculative systems, the scholastic as well as the modern rationalist which flourished in the seventeenth century. But this disparagement in itself was not due to the subject matter of metaphysics.

An illustration of this state of affairs is Condillac, who represents a historical core of the movement and who also had a significant influence on Bello's earlier development. At the beginning of his career, in 1746, Condillac, declared that:

> It is necessary to distinguish two classes of metaphysics. The ambitious kind seeks to penetrate all of the mysteries of nature, the



> essence of being, the most occult causes; this is what seeks to please and to promise discoveries. The other kind of metaphysics is more restrained, and adapts its investigations to the limitations of the human spirit. It is a little concerned about that which must elude it as it is eager about what it is able to capture. It knows to restrain itself in the limits that are marked off for it.

And in 1775, without any theoretical abandoning of the sensationist point of departure, he was more precise:

> Of all the sciences, metaphysics is the one which more completely embraces all the objects of our knowledge; it is at once the science of sensible truths and the science of absolute truth [. . .]. It is the most abstract science; towering above that which we see and feel, it raises us up to God (26).

With greater reason, this also was the position of Bello, due in part to the well-known inclinations of his spirit, and in part to the circumstances when he decided to write formally about philosophy, or finding himself developing his own philosophical position, he already was being carried along on the full wave of the romantic metaphysical restoration. The well-known assertion of Menéndez y Pelayo that Bello was "certainly very little metaphysical" does not appear sustainable. The context of the assertion of Menéndez y Pelayo also held it proper to consider Bello a somewhat mitigated "positivist" (27). The truth is that, in presenting his writings on psychology and logic, he permeates his work with topics and developments that are proper to metaphysics.

Already in the brief Introduction, Bello himself pays attention to making known his general view about metaphysics. After presenting his previously noted way of organizing philosophy, he added the following in a note at the bottom of the page:

> Metaphysics or the science of first truths is, in part, Ontology (which is the science of being or of the most general qualities of existence). Ontology includes the Philosophy of Mind (which deals with the activities of the mind or the spirit) and Theodocy (which investigates, through the use of reason, the existence and attributes of the Divinity). These topics do not form special sections in this book. The materials which I have enumerated above have a close connection with Mental Psychology and Logic, since the analysis of our intellectual acts gives us the basic and primary expression of all of these notions, and the theory of judgment and of reasoning carries us naturally to the knowledge of those principles or primary truths which serve as a guide to the understanding in the investigation of all other truths. Thus I have disseminated Metaphysics in Mental Psychology and Logic, and I have given, in the form of an Appendix, what appeared to me to be linked less closely to the science of the human understanding (28).

Such a clarification amounted not only to the recognition of the position of metaphysics as "the science of the first truths," but also to the anticipated notice of its presence in the two parts of the work. Obviously, these materials will not form "special sections." But since "they have a close link with Mental Psychology and Logic," they will

form a part of these presentations. Yet there is more. It would not follow that what was "linked less closely with the science of the human understanding," however much metaphysical it might be, would be excluded; it would be given under the "form of an Appendix."

These initial reminders were not only confirmed later in the steps taken in the treatise, but also at a particular time the author pauses to provide its theoretical foundation. In one of the chapters of Logic where he discusses method, he writes about ontology with this introductory statement: "Ontology, which deals with general ideas of existence, time, space, cause and effect, the finite and the infinite, matter and spirit, substance and accidents, is in a large measure psychology itself" (29).

The passage becomes one of the most expressly illuminating of the nature of the whole in the text. It is not that ontology and psychology become identified. But ontology is in a large part psychology itself. In continuing, he gives the reason for this view:

> It is because psychology is what has to do with determining what are general ideas, manifesting in what way we form them and what they signify in a rigorous sense. It is psychology which, investigating the origin of our complex concepts, is able to give us the element of time and the element of space, the intellectual forms of causality and of infinity. It is what lays out the limits of the intuition and of the senses, which are the only perceptive faculties of man. It is what discovers in the depths of thought the primary elements of reason and the eternal standards of the faculty of reason (30).

It is not possible to advance in psychology without delving into ontology, in the same way that it is not possible to develop ontology without departing from psychology:

> Thus, the base of Ontology is the analysis of thought in its primitive elements, the exposition of those facts of conscience which dominate all intellectual activities. The principles constitute a property, an inseparable element of the spirit, and the consequences which are deduced from them motivates all the less confidence because they become further removed from their source (31).

The same observation applies to theodicy since it is only another part of ontology:

> Theodicy, or natural theology, is a branch of ontology. It departs from the significant fact of the existence of the universe and from the interlinking of causes and effects to raise us to the first of all causes, to the source of being. It traces the attributes of the Creator examining his works; and from these attributes and from the examining of what happens in created intelligence, it deduces the destiny of man, to the degree that this is given to the human reason to know about it. Combining attentive observation to a limited number of demonstrative processes, it reads in the fluctuating features of the phenomenal universe the eternal order, the traits of uncreative activity, and the linking of means and ends in which human destinies are written (32).



Upon such bases, offered at the end of all the work, Bello's Psychology or Mental Psychology tends from the first to delve into metaphysics with theodicy included in it. The resulting metaphysical references not only help to throw light on Bello's psychological developments, and thus his logical developments, but they also constitute the core of his psychological thought. Without underestimating the sharpness and originality of much of his analysis in the technical fields of psychology and logic, the primary characteristic of his work always will remain the metaphysical texture in his presentation of his psychology and logic.

Naturally, the systematic priority which psychology displays in the text is not merely exposition. In its character, it is foundational. Already in 1841, some years prior to the publication of the first chapters of his treatise, Bello had placed this dissident marginal note in a work written by Pierre Leroux which he himself translated: "The psychological method always has been known in philosophy; there can not be philosophy without it" (33). Thus his own logic, including its abundant metaphysical references, becomes a psychological logic, or a logical psychologicalism.

We see Bello considering each one of the questions raised in the paragraphs quoted above as the object of ontology, a psychologist ontology, as each one passes by in its turn in the unfolding of his psychology. Of primary concern will be issues regarding the origin of knowledge, the notion of substance, the relation of causality, the idea of God, that is, those primary questions around which both the crisis and negation of metaphysics as well as its persistence and restoration have turned in the modern period. The coherent position taken by Bello regarding all of these questions shapes in a definitive manner his metaphysics, which, in this context, includes his theory of knowledge.

Moving always in the broad channel opened by Locke, Bello was not an orthodox follower of any of the representatives of what we have called the modern "philosophy of the understanding." Yet just as Condillac and Destutt de Tracy were the ones who spurred on or motivated Bello, either through attraction or reaction, in the development of his own grammatical philosophy, so Berkeley appealed to him more than any other intellectual in the area of primary philosophy.

In writing about philosophical intuition in the first years of this century and in taking what he regards as an exceptionally good model, Bergson distinguishes "four fundamental theses" in Berkeley's philosophy. Setting forth these theses as the classes of broadest scope, Bergson identifies them as idealism, nominalism, spiritualism, and theism (34). The distinction interested Bergson as a way to set forth original as well as unique intuition, since he found all these trends represented in the philosophy advanced by the Bishop of Cloyne. Without all these trends being necessarily related among themselves, they were in this context diverse aspects of a philosophical view that in itself was indivisible. Although in his case these theses and their inner connections appear with a personal stamp, Bello felt a strong affinity with this historical form of related and unified intuition. In Bello's position, these theses also are the four fundamental trends of his philosophic awareness. They are in their own way equally discernible, yet equally inseparable, in the unity of his philosophic views.

We are to see them in the conventional order which appears to us more illuminating of what turns out to be his major leading convictions; it is a distinct order which Bergson also conventionally selects with regard to Berkeley's philosophy. Spiritualism and theism with immediate support in the primary psychological ideas of substance and of cause constitute Bello's two major philosophical definitive notions. They are primary in the double sense of being the overarching doctrinal views of broadest scope and the historical current of greatest volume. Idealism and nominalism, which in themselves are more restricted, complement these two primary views at the point where, in his position, ontology both touches upon and takes up epistemological issues.

The problems of the relations between thought and language lead from nominalism in the end to the bases of philosophy in general and of grammar in particular in the work of the native of Caracas. In opposition to a widely held exegetical tradition about Bello regarding these latter materials, these bases also had their metaphysical grounding. It is clear that on certain occasions, such as in the prologue to his well-known major grammatical work, he made known that some theoretical features found in this material were not to be interpreted as "metaphysical speculations." This warning has been the principal source of this exegetical tradition, with its great ambiguity about the relation of Bello to general philosophical grammar.

By attributing to Bello a "pejorative use of the word 'metaphysics,'" Amado Alonso has contributed to strengthening the above tradition. It has been seen that such a pejorative meaning does not fit the use of "metaphysics" in the Philosophy of the Understanding. He equally carries over this usage with the most admirable reflections in his grammatical works. There is a clear example of this feature in the prologue of Análisis Ideológica de los Tiempos de la Conjugación Castellana, 1841. Bello states:

> In the subtle and fleeting analogies upon which the selection of verb forms depends and in like manner about some other parts of the language, there is found a marvelous linking of metaphysical relations, knitted together with an order and a precision which are surprising when it is taken into account that it is due entirely to popular usage, the true and only craftsman of languages.

And in the Gramática de la Lengua Castellana, 1847, in calling attention about the expression "lo" [it], which at the same time in the Spanish language can be predicate and accusative, Bello observes that, "This is one of so many metaphysical concepts enclosed in the language; and more than once they have made brilliant suggestions to philosophy" (35).

## IV. Spiritualism and Theism

In the development of modern philosophy, it is not difficult to distinguish on several occasions various recurring crises of metaphysics. Of course, these crises have diverse features which emerge from their different historical contexts. But the most significant crisis culminates in Kant and customarily is known as the classical crisis. In one sense, it is the source of the crisis itself; in another sense, it is



the point of departure for overcoming this crisis. These expressions or forms of this historical crisis were not concluded willy-nilly by the frank denial of the legitimacy of metaphysics. Yet they at least had in common critical inquiry and the subsequent placing in question of the scope of two ideas which had constituted its two basic supports, which were the ideas of substance and of cause.

It is unnecessary to add that both the impulse and the probing, whether great or small, of this criticism proceeded from more or less extreme empirical views about the origin of knowledge within the context raised by Locke.

The psychological analyses which Bello undertook led him to face successively each of these ideas. He did this in full awareness of the critical spirit which prevailed during the period of his earlier development and even of his mature years. While he was witnessing the romantic reaction against such a critical attitude, his own development will orient him toward a kind of eclectic synthesis which would avoid the ambiguities prevalent in the romantic movement. Without prejudice to the multiplying reservations about the limits of the human understanding, he continues in agreement with the psychological tradition of the "philosophy of the understanding" in its established meaning and he remains categorical in his acceptance of the legitimacy and usefulness of these two basic ideas, which he refines in a personal way. The idea of substance will be the primary ground for his spiritualism, and the idea of cause will be the primary base for his theism.

Already prior to finalizing Chapter I, where he focuses on perception with sensation as its most simple element as a basic operation of the understanding, Bello approaches the notion of substance. The manner in which he begins to carry out this task is typical of the movement which was providing him with his basic orientation. This continues even to the point of indicating that Bello would not do anything other than pursue this tradition without hesitation: "The modifications which the soul unfolds to itself are considered usually as qualities which successively and continually superimpose themselves on a substance or a support which is like the undergirdings of the soul." Again he continues, "But we ought to be on guard against the fascinations exercised over us by metaphorical words which by necessity we value in helping us to conceive this mysterious evolution of spiritual phenomena" (36).

After such precaution in which the philosophy of language begins to appear unified from the beginning with the philosophy of the understanding, which then will be present throughout the hundreds of pages which follow, it appears that the only required outcome has to be the denial of the idea of substance. Not at all. The precaution in this passage primarily is opposed to the notion of quality more so than to the notion of substance. Clearly, one of the features commonly attributed to substance is its materiality with its assumed ontological support of the external world. But Bello rejects this position. Although he does touch upon this concern in the first chapter, he subsequently presents in this work a more completly developed view which we shall examine in a subsequent discussion of his idealism. Yet in spite of the tenor of the passages quoted above, he definitely and conclusively offers his acceptance of a substantial soul.

Immediately following, he adds:

> In each one of its acts, the soul is completely whole according to what we previously have said. And it is necessary to reconcile the identity of the soul and its indivisible unity of which we constantly have an essential intuition with the apparent differences which conscience shows to us in the soul.

Like the introduction to Chapter II, these words focused on what its summary calls the "Notion of the Substantial Self." In the following paragraph, all of Bello's spiritualistic substantialism becomes condensed:

> The soul, looking at itself as identical, continuous, and one under all of its simultaneous and successive modifications, places all of these modifications in itself, as in something which serves them as a base and support; otherwise, it would not be able to consider them as its own. From that introspective act, the soul infers that it perceives this something intuitively and that the intuitive perception of its modifications, far from giving us a posteriori the notion of the substantial self, involves this latter notion as its one necessary element (37).

There was no contradiction between his initial precaution and this final conclusion. Leaving aside for a while the noted problem of material substance, the original precaution as it becomes clarified was not directed against either the notion of the self or the soul as substance. Rather its opposition was directed against a particular and fixed conception of the soul. This rejected notion of ancient vintage regarding the substantiality of the soul assumed the soul to be different by nature from the modifications which the conscience experiences. Bello points out that the common name for these modifications was "qualities." Victor Cousin had renewed the older view in holding that from the soul viewed as a substance there was no immediate perception. His justification for taking this position was that the soul resulted only from a judgment and thus from reasoning based on those modifications.

In his own way, Bello also rose up against the doctrine of substantial spiritualism. He refers to this view, which at that time was at the height of its intellectual and critical summit in French universities, as "the illustrious head of the eclectic school." The soul substance discloses itself to us through a direct perception that is simultaneous with what we have of its own modifications rather than through a relational judgment that we make. Bello states that, "The modifications are nothing other than this modified substance itself. To become aware of the modifications without becoming aware of the modified substance is absolutely impossible." As he was closing the same Chapter II, he comments further: "Thus we become intuitively aware of our own soul. Yet neither is it possible to describe our soul nor do we know its nature except to the extent that the phenomena attested by the conscience are present (38).

The grounding of the substantial self on immediate psychological experience with the resulting view that requires no differentiation among the constant modifications which the soul undergoes softens, at this



point, nothing less than the classical antinomy between substance and accidents. However affirmative his notion of spiritual substance may have been, Bello was advancing a philosophically heterodox point of view. From the periods of Escobar Palma and Mendoden y Pelayo, the primary motivation for the criticisms opposed to Bello's general doctrine of substance by the intellectual sector most attached to tradition ought to be seen as much in Bello's denial of material substance as in anything else.

In presenting his views about a substantial soul, Bello was developing or refining theoretical issues which made more difficult the justification of his view on any grounds other than empirical considerations. Yet in writing as a philosopher rather than as a theologian, Bello had no doubts. Although as we have seen, "we do not know the nature" of the soul, it is as much substantial as immortal. But the reasons for holding to such immortality are not ontological ones derived from the notion of the immateriality and simplicity of the soul. Arguments based on these notions also would apply to the souls of animals, whose souls also manifest these characteristics. Bello's reasons for supporting the immortality of the soul have the moral order as their ground:

> With regard to the immateriality of soul of brutes, it does not follow [. . .] that their soul is destined to immortality, since from the immaterial and the simple the immortal does not necessarily follow [. . .]. We know that the human soul is immortal; but not because it is unextended, but rather by other kind of proofs which we deduce from the moral phenomena of the universe [. . .]. There is for man a future destiny capable of satisfying his aspirations. The human soul survives death. [. . .] The moral order ought to receive its complement and its perfection beyond the grave [. . .]. The reason alone suffices to see written in oral phenomena of which we are witnesses, a future which awaits us beyond the grave (39).

The metaphysical spiritualism of Bello in its decisive elements remained integrated in this way. Obviously, it would not be possible to conceive it accurately if it were separated from his theism. By design, we have evaded this topic until this point in order to assure the greatest fidelity to the systematic developments of Bello's work. We shall see how the same kind of psychological analysis led him to this theistic position which he converts into the cornerstone of his entire system. Thus, it will become the point of departure for the idea of cause.

In this area, Bello carried out a personal historico-doctrinal synthesis, similar to the one he would perform relative to the idea of substance. On the one hand, he accepts as his own the criticism which the extreme empiricists held about the notion of cause as an idea of necessary connection inherent in the nature of things. But on the other hand, he avoids skeptical phenomenalism and explains through the first cause, which is both efficient as well as final, all the objective and subjective, physical and psychological manifestations of causality.

The same initial study of perception led Bello to the idea of cause with all of its metaphysical derivations. After distinguishing between "intuitive perceptions" (self-contemplation of the conscience through the faculty of intuiting), and "sensitive perceptions" (resulting in the

awareness of organic impressions through the faculty of feeling), he divides the "sensitive perceptions" by classifying them as external and internal. This later division distinguishes between the respective sources which modify impressions as external or internal to the organism. Viewed only as a phenomenon of consciousness and beyond its organic base, the corresponding psychic modification is the sensation.

As a consequence, there are intuitive perceptions which by their nature are not a part of sensation. Bello says: "Sensation is an element of perception. It is not the complete perception but only an element of sensitive perception." He then takes advantage of the occasion to distinguish between his own sensationism and that of Condillac, under whose philosophical patronage he had begun. Later he returns to develop further this issue:

> Thus we take the words to feel and sensation in a much less extensive meaning than that of the sensationist school. For that school, sensation is perception, judgment, reasoning, desire, volition, etc. In essence, that school sees nothing more than transformed sensations in all the affections and operations of the soul (40).

After making such distinctions, Bello considers what he calls "relative perceptions." He does not discuss them as a third group, which would be different by nature among themselves from the "intuitive" and the "sensitive" perceptions. He discusses the issue of the result which follows from the joining together of the intuitive and the sensitive perceptions (external or internal) in the understanding. And there spontaneously arises a third element in perception different from the mere aggregate of each of the above two kinds of perceptions placed together. This third perception is that of a relation, from which he derives the name of relational perceptions. It is difficult to exaggerate the great importance which the classic notion of relation carries in Bello's philosophy. Aristotle had elevated the notion of relation to a category and, with its revival in the modern period, Locke and Hume had given it an empirical criterion and Leibniz and Kant a rationalistic one.

Let it be sufficient to remember that modern empiricism comes to use as its equivalent the expressions of "connection" and, above all, of "association." From this latter expression came its influential usage in the hallowed location "association of ideas," and also in the psychological doctrine which came to be called "associationism." In this regard, Hume was decisive. This tradition continued in the historical sequence of James Mill and his son, John Stuart Mill. Bello, who refers as often as possible to James Mill, almost always uses the expression "relation" to avoid this substitute wording, which in the setting of the "philosophy of the understanding" had been the expression which Locke especially preferred.

For the man from Caracas, relation is an object of a perception. But it is not so simple that it permits just any term to become a part of a relational expression. Rather a relation is a link established between two terms by means of a comparison which simultaneously includes each of them. Such as comparison relates in a unique act of perception one or several attributes to one or the other term. If the attributes are of the same meaning, we have before us homologous relations like



resemblance and contiguity; if they are of an opposite meaning, we have before us relations that are "antilogous" or opposing each other, as causality and succession (41).

In the detailed analysis of each one of these, the author proceeds thoroughly. And he arrives at "the relation of cause and effect," the subject of Chapter IX. Until this section, he had not departed from the general study of perception which he began in Chapter I. Only the perceptions of relation, and thus of causality, are not received passively by the conscience. "In the perception of a relation, the soul is essentially active. It takes out of the compared perceptions what does not exist separately in any one of them. And because of this, I have said that the soul in this act conceives, generates" (42). This principle of activity of the soul will be primary in Bello's idea of cause since it introduces an essential difference between his view and that of mechanistic associationism.

A similar activity through which the understanding establishes a connection between causes and effects, "results from a tendency or instinct, which appears common to man and to many other animal species; by virtue of this tendency, we take for granted that in similar circumstances it constantly is verified that certain acts would be followed by certain others (43). Moreover, this assumption requires the equally instinctive belief in the stability of natural laws, that is, in what Bello later was to call the empirical principle and what still later was called natural determinism. This principle has as its complement the principle of causality so that both necessarily are found implicated in "all reasoning founded on experience" (44).

None of the above views finds a connection which the understanding conceives as absolutely necessary among phenomena whose constant succession it observes. In an extensive first Appendix to this chapter, Bello defends a doctrine against Reid and Cousin, who derived their views on this topic from classical rationalism. Although Bello attributes the source of his doctrine to Hobbes and Locke, it actually culminates in Hume. Since in this view the relation of causality does not express anything other than the more constant succession of two phenomena, it in no way expresses an intrinsically necessary link between these phenomena. In developing his position, Bello refers to an assumed mysteriously producing action of the effect by the cause as an "illusion" (45). Thus he sets forth this conclusion before advancing it further in the Appendix. Between cause and effect, there is no necessary connection:

> Because if the connection between such phenomena were absolutely necessary, it would be essential to suppose in the universe a multitude of causes which, destitute of intelligence and of will, would work nevertheless with the greatest harmony to produce with one accord this amazing order in which we discover ends and means, that is, will and intelligence, at every turn (46).

The explanation is in another direction. This very harmony of the universe compells us "to recognize an Author and all powerful legislator, whose will has established the connections of phenomena from which the general order results" (47).

The philosophical access to the idea of God begins with causality and proceeds from the "slave causes" in the physical order of nature to the "free causes" in the moral order of the will. This approach further leads Bello to add to this chapter, "Of the Relation of Cause and Effect," a second extensive Appendix with the title, "Of the Supreme Being and of His Attributes." This highly characteristic section, which also is consistent with the rest of the treatise, concludes by clarifying as much the general metaphysical base of his treatise as the speculative significance of theism within the general framework of Bello's doctrine. Obviously, this kind of philosophical theism with its roots in the strict field of causality departs significantly from the skeptical probabilism of Hume.

## V. Psychological Idealism

The diversity of the philosophical applications of the notion of idealism, even when it is restricted to contrast with realism as its only fitting antithesis, is well known. Disregarding its current use as an expression opposed to materialism, where through convention it is given a broader range than spiritualism, we find this diversity expressed in two distinctive ways. First, it can refer to various problems in the areas of knowledge, of being, and of value. Second, even in dealing with a single problem, within a given subject area, the definition of idealism, in opposition to that of realism, can take distinct forms.

In Bello's case, the idealism with which he deals follows from conceiving the physical world as purely subjective, while the natural conscience with both great certainty and spontaneity represents the physical world as exterior to it. Moreover, unlike *a priori* logic, psychological idealism through its *a posteriori* sensory base provides for this subjective awareness. We should add that Bello began the use of idealism as a technical expression in his philosophy at a very late date. But even then he uses the expression "idealism" not so much as a theoretical construct in his system but rather as a philosophical doctrine.

The problem which focuses on the nature of our knowledge of an exterior object and on the issue of whether such objects are present in a world external to the knowing subject is both epistemological and ontological. Bello discusses these issues with some striking particularities. In order to prevent possible confusions, these issues are in need of initial clarification.

On the one hand, the problem of knowledge with these related issues is present from the first pages of the treatise and frequently is thrust into the foreground. It culminates as a specific subject in no less place than the final chapter on Psychology; it reappears in the Logic. Moreover, it is the express topic of one of his three articles on philosophical criticism, one of which he devotes to Balmes. On the other hand, Bello on more than one occasion tends to minimize it as a problem and he comes to refer to it as "sterile" and even as "frivolous." But the situation is that if there is a logical incompatibility between the above cases, it is only in the formal appearances. In fact, Bello continued to regard the problem as very important. The topic always made a strong appeal to him and even became one of his favorites. Yet in some



of these discussions, there were motives foreign to his philosophy itself. To be precise, some of these factors which on occasion led him to those expressions grew out of the particular religious environment in which he wrote and took on the feature of more or less obligatory evasions.

These reservations occurred not only with regard to the specific nature of the problem, but also in the context of a possible idealistic solution to it. Having been faced many times with the need to defend this position with passion, he often sets it aside quickly. Obviously, he does this in an appropriate but plain way, like simmering theological dogmas upon embers. It is important to make this clear for what it has to do not only with the position of Bello regarding this problem, but also with the most intimate condition of his philosophic and even his philosophico-religious conscience.

There is a need to approach the problem which arises from assuming that Bello held unmistakable idealistic positions from the first development of his view of perception. His holding to such views would have occurred long before his own progress led him to the name of Berkeley in the text of his treatise. But it will be Berkeley's doctrine which will provide him with the appropriate opportunity to express his views on this topic. After finding support in Berkeley's view in various places of the treatise, he approaches it in greater detail in the decisive chapter with the title "Of Matter," in the division on Psychology. After making an extensive defense of his position, but only from the angle of a single possibility, Bello abruptly ends the discussion with this phrase which, in a certain manner, is disconcerting: "But although in rigor the doctrine of Berkeley could be admitted as a possible assumption in the eyes of philosophy, it is incontestable that it is opposed to some of the more essential dogmas both of Catholicism and of almost all the Christian churches" (48).

In the mentioned article about Balmes, the Catalan, Bello emphasizes the objection to Berkeley from the point of view of theological dogma. Opposing the realism of the Catalan, Bello understands that it is through the idealistic system that reason makes up its mind without revelation. But he adds that, "We say reason without revelation since the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation openly contradicts idealism." And still further along he states: "We look at the idealistic system as a false hypothesis because it is opposed to Catholic dogma, but the reason by itself is not able to demonstrate its falsehood" (49).

After the above statements, it might appear out of place to consider Bello an idealist. Yet in these statements there is a clear boundary between philosophy, on the one hand, and theology or revealed dogma, on the other. And even though he safeguards his verbal fidelity to theological orthodoxy and respects within this sphere the reality of the external world, his preferences follow the order of reason. But in his use of this technique, he resorts to the use of irony in subtle support of the Anglican Bishop of Cloyne rather than of the Catholic Bishop of Vich.

It is well known that during a long stretch of western philosophy reservations of such nature were not in any way exceptional (50). This

practice was even more prevalent in considering the mysteries which followed from the doctrine of transubstantiation. In its deliberations regarding possible philosophical solutions to the mystery of the Eucharist, the Council of Trent, in the sixteenth century, converted the doctrine of transubstantiation into Catholic dogma. Not only had the Protestant reformers disagreed with this theological doctrine, but since the medieval period many theologians of the Roman Church also had expressed dissent about the merits of this view. In the debate on this subject, theological views came to be linked narrowly to the range of two controverted philosophical dualisms which dealt with substance and accident and essence and existence. Although after Trent many intellectuals of the Catholic confession found that as a theological issue this topic was closed, and even though as writers they were inhibited in addressing this question, they had no reason to feel satisfied subjectively within a philosophical point of view since the Council's decision dealt only with a historical interpretation of revelation.

Without doubt, the above kind of situation would hold for an idealist like Bello, who had periods of passionate feelings about this matter. The adherents of transubstantiation fought with the advocates of idealism by requiring that prior to the Eucharist the bread and the wine be accorded the condition of substantiality and thus of physical bodies. But the Eucharist then reduced such physical bodies to a condition of mere accidents. Without prejudice to conventional manifestations, the authentic Catholic faith of the native of Caracas need not have felt itself damaged by this incompatibility which his philosophical reason was resolving in its own way. On the other hand, it need not have been the only point of his disagreement with religious dogmas carried by such chance historical exegeses to a level of speculative abstraction.

An earlier incident during his stay in London throws light on this subject. Under conditions that are unknown but in circumstances of profound spiritual tribulation, in 1821 Bello went to see a close friend, the well-known José María Blanco White, who was among the Spanish emigrants in London at that time. In his subsequent responding letter, Blanco White writes to Bello, among other things:

> Those who, as you and I, have become accustomed to doubt about religious points [. . .]. The proofs that the Christian religion did not originate in mere fraud are very strong; but nothing is more difficult to determine than its abstract doctrines [. . .]. Moreover, our future fortune is in the hands of our Creator, who can not call us to account for not understanding the unintelligible; neither can he submit us to explanations which add obscurity to the obscure [. . .]. With regard to mysteries, not only do I not understand them, but neither am I able to discover which would be those that are de facto revealed (51).

Obviously, it is Blanco White who speaks in this letter. But in some ways Bello also is present, and he kept this letter from his old friend until his death. In the light of an incident such as this, it is not difficult to understand the slight impression that the pronouncements of the theologians of Trent were able to make on Bello's idealistic metaphysical convictions and even less on his own religious faith. But the above assertion needs to be understood as being made without prejudice to the obvious reservations relevant to these circumstances. So many decisive passages of his treatise reflect this point of view.



From the strict beginning, Bello came face to face with the notion of matter in the idealistic position. And in the very first paragraphs of the initial chapter in a section dealing with perception, Bello hastens to characterize matter as only "that which is capable of producing sensation." He seeks to establish at the end of the discussion that "what matter and material qualities are in themselves other than merely as cause of sensations, we do not know. Neither is such knowledge accessible to the mental faculties with which we are endowed." Scarcely is all of this introductory to the categorical definition of Chapter II. After affirming that the soul as a substance is not differentiated from its modifications, he denies that on its part substance is a condition for matter:

> But what! Perhaps one will say, "Do we not perceive the modifications of matter without perceiving in some way the substance in which these modifications reside?" We respond that we never perceive directly the modifications of matter; we only perceive them representatively by means of the sensations which it produces in the soul (52).

It is well to point out that although Bello presents here an idealistic definition only in passing, he also repeats it in like manner on other occasions when it is convenient to do so. The denial of the reality of space and time, a relevant point of his idealism, deserves special emphasis. And we shall give particular attention to this issue in our Chapter VII. Let us mention here as a significant example of other developments what he establishes in presenting "Of the Relation of Identity," in Chapter XII of the treatise: "Properly, we do not perceive another substance other than that of the individual self. And this situation serves as a model to represent to us what we attribute through an instinctive and irresistible analogy to other intelligent and sensitive beings." The succeeding paragraph, which we now quote, is highly paramount on this issue:

> Do we conceive substance in bodies? Do we conceive that there would be in them something real, although neither intelligible nor sensible, which serves as a base for qualities which we imagine in them? We do not know these qualities except through corresponding sensations and by the relations which between them the spirit conceives. We do not know them except as causes of sensations which we perceive in ourselves, and of relations which our spirit engenders through a kind of activity which is appropriate to it and which compares the sensations. The idea of substantiality in bodies is not until this point anything other than the idea of causality (53).

The last reference in the above paragraph to the idea of causality will lead Bello by the hand to the base of idealism and naturally to a theistic base through his already known conception of causality. It is here where there was to take place his coincidental meeting with Berkeley. It was in Berkeley's name that he refutes the realism of the school of Edinburgh, passing judgment specifically on its founder, Thomas Reid. In opposition to what has been said many times, Bello was not a follower

Berkeley primarily focused his polemics against Locke. From the first pages of his Introduction, he begins his attack by pointing out in a given place that, "I shall consider now the source of this dominant notion, which to my way of seeing is language" (59). Likewise, from the beginning of his treatise, Bello will place himself on this ground, although he will not superimpose in any way his criticism of abstraction upon the views of Berkeley.

Already in Chapter II, Bello alludes to the philosophico-linguistic problem of ideas and of abstract names, but at that point he does not go into these views in a detailed way. Although Bello explicitly accepts in this chapter the nominalist position, he does so somewhat in passing:

> The error of those believing that we perceive the modifications and not the substance comes from the prestige which abstract names exercise over us. From this prestige originated many erroneous concepts in the philosophical schools of the ancients. And even after the triumph of the nominalists, many vestiges of these errors were continued. We speak of modifications and of substance as of real things which are put on the top of other real things in the way that clothing is put over a body which it covers; although this concept is hidden with specious language, it is absurd (60).

If, like a guiding thread, it would turn out useful to establish from the beginning the essential differences between the views of abstraction of Bello and of Berkeley with regard to the nominalism which linked them together, the following would have to be said: (1) Berkeley rejects the level of abstraction distinguished from generalization. He considers it more than illegitimate; it is impossible and thus can not be existent since such a level would require mutually exclusive notions. Bello not only legitimizes such a distinction in a given sense, but he also even makes it his defense without prejudice of avoiding, like Berkeley, the identification between generalization and abstraction, between general ideas and abstract ideas. (2) Berkeley challenges all abstraction as a generic "doctrine of abstraction." Bello upholds his own particular and affirmative doctrine of abstraction. (3) Berkeley passes judgment on what he calls assumed abstract ideas as always deceptive products of language. Bello prefers to pass judgment on bad use of what he calls abstract names in the field of philosophy and he finds this abuse to occur frequently.

The different scope which each one gives to the notion of idea provides the point of departure, and only the point of departure, for understanding the differences between Berkeley and Bello. In agreement with the psychologist tradition of the philosophy of the understanding, which Bello received originally through the line of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy, the Venezuelan agrees with the Irishman as well as with his French predecessors that the idea, which etymologically signifies image, proceeds from the sensory source of perception. But while Berkeley applies the name of idea even to the actual perception, Bello restricts the expression only to what he calls "renewed perception" in the sense of renewed by the memory or by the imagination. Already in Chapter I, where he discusses "Of the Perception," he states succintly the following view:



> Although this spiritual affection coexists with the corporeal state which produces it, we have a present perception. When this ends, what remains of that affection, or revives afterwards in the soul, is a renewed perception, a recollection, an idea [. . .]. The perceptions renewed by simple memory or by the imagination are called ideas. Idea signifies image; the renewed perceptions have been called images of present perceptions by the resemblance which they truly have with their original perceptions (61).

Yet what is decisive is not this semantic difference, which has in part a background in the same tradition. Rather it is in the distinction that Bello later introduces between proper and improper ideas and that provides the basis for a valuable personal doctrine of ideas which he differentiates from mere perceptive images, even though such images always are the necessary source of the ideas.

Before approaching this doctrine, which he discusses in several chapters beginning with the thirteenth of his treatise, Bello makes other advances of his view in the Appendix to Chapter VII:

> We have two species of ideas. Proper ideas are nothing other than absolute or relative remembered perceptions; improper ideas are imperfect and supplementary. Intellectual signs provide the occasions for the development of proper ideas relative to those things which the perceptive faculties of the understanding are unable to reach (62).

The first two expressions, "inappropriate" or "imperfect," which are used to characterize the second kind of ideas, suggest a negative evaluation of them. Yet the risk of such a negative view for them as well as for the third designation of "supplementary" ideas should be avoided. Rather Bello's position was completely to the contrary.[7] All of the final turn of this same paragraph suggests that at the appropriate moment all of these ideas are positively to be named ideas-signs. The overlooking of their nature can result in many errors, but if they are used properly, they are fundamental in importance for human knowledge.

We already have said that all modern philosophers of the understanding are empirical; only one sector which became the dominant one was also nominalistic at the same time. Not everyone within this nominalistic movement differentiates, as do Berkeley and later Bello, between general ideas and abstract ideas. Likewise, in the same nominalistic movement, abstract ideas were only general ideas for the master Condillac (63) and for Destutt de Tracy. Passing over Condillac, Bello criticizes such an identification of abstract and general ideas and confronts directly the doctrine of Destutt de Tracy which was nearer to his own views and shared by the ideologist school of which Destutt de Tracy was the head. Bello even continued this opposition during the time he lived in Chile.

We are not able to follow here the details of Bello's reasoning which he joins to the assertion of his intellectual independence. The following quotation, which is not unique in his treatise, exemplifies this point of view:

> When I feel obligated to separate myself from the opinion of so many eminent philosophers, however strong the reasons which serve in my favor appear to me, I can not do less than to distrust myself. With all of this, I ought to say that, however much I think about this matter, the more I am convinced that the writers to whom I refer have adopted without sufficient inquiry the doctrine of the schools (64).

Let us look only at his two primary conclusions: The first conclusion is negative. With the word abstraction, some philosophers

> have wanted to signify a certain mysterious procedure, similar to an intellectual distillation, through which we extract general ideas from individuals like in a press which extracts from flowers the essence to which their aroma is united. Abstraction in this sense ought to be erased from the catalogue of intellectual operations (65).

The second conclusion is positive:

> To attend exclusively to certain qualities is neither more nor less than to attend exclusively to certain perceptions. And if we limit the meaning of the word to abstract to this exclusive attention, I do not find inconvenience in its use [. . .]. If abstraction is no more than the attention directed to a quality separately perceptible, to the exclusion of others which accompany it and which also would be separately perceptible, perhaps there is hardly an act of the thought in which abstraction does not intervene (66).

Yet in subsequent pages he will write:

> Abstraction does occur if it is considered as the faculty of contemplating separately certain parts or qualities of objects and of classifying them according to the resemblances which we discover in them. But in nothing does it differentiate itself from what we commonly call attention (67).

Viewed as a perception of resemblance, in as much as this resemblance is one of the forms of perceptions of relations at the same time that it is regarded as a psychological phenomenon of attention, Bello affirms that the abstraction exists. It is a clear contrast with Berkeley, for whom abstraction is inexistent by being impossible, although, indeed general ideas exist, but these ideas are never abstract (68).

Bello makes his theory more subtle. He discards Berkeley's view that it is "completely inadmissible" to accept the word "abstraction," a position "which assumes that the abstract and the general are synonymous." He then distinguishes what, in his judgment, are two different but equally proper meanings in the admissible acceptance of abstraction. These are the use of abstraction as a figure of speech or as a metaphor and its use as analysis. In many, if not all, of the uses of "abstraction," both of these meanings are present (69). He summarizes:

> The abstraction with which many philosophers have pretended to explain generalization is an erroneous assumption. The abstraction which consists in giving to qualities a fictitious independent existence, representing them as substantives, is a figure of speech. The abstraction in which we condense certain qualities and disregard all the others which accompany them is a true act of the understanding. The first is a fanciful abstraction; the second is a figurative abstraction; the third is an analytic abstraction (70).



In considering further the relation of abstraction to generalization, it is essential to understand that even though there can be generalization without abstraction, abstraction in its two admissible senses (of a figure of speech and of analysis) always assumes a generalization (71). The result is that in Bello's judgment, in opposition to Berkeley's position, there are, indeed, general abstract ideas. And they not only exist but they also fulfill a major function in language and in knowledge.

He does not cease to insist on the dangers which surround the manipulation of abstract names if anyone begins to assume that they signify real entities. In a highly revealing passage about his most basic philosophical affiliation, he states:

> The use of abstract names produces an illusion. (Such illusions appear to be a normal condition found in human societies since we find such names in the most primitive languages.) In not a small way, this kind of illusion has arisen from those absurdities which have contaminated the philosophy of the understanding for centuries. And perhaps they are not purged from all the works of Locke, Berkeley, Condillac, and other eminent philosophers. We have had from the peripatetic school substantial forms that are qualities attributed to certain species of independent reality. Hence, there are so many erroneous concepts relative to space and time (72).

At the same time, Bello defends abstraction with regard to its necessity and utility. This is evident in sentences immediately preceding and following the above passage:

> Abstraction in the meaning in which we now take this word is, as we have said, a figure of speech and an artifice of language. It is a fiction which enables us to express relations among the modes of being of things with ease and liveliness. And perhaps it also helps us to conceive these relations [. . .]. It makes easier the use of language and, at the same time, it does this in a more expressive way (73).

With such a defense, he becomes enthusiastic in one of his writings about Balmes:

> Abstract names enclose a species of fiction or metaphor which consists in representing as part of one thing what really is the same thing under a definite point of view [. . .]. And it is not to be believed that this fiction is a useless figure. To the contrary, we see in it one of the most marvelous impulses of language. It would not be possible without it to express the actual relations of things in a sufficiently clear and precise way [. . .]. Thus the abundance of abstract elements of which a language consists can be

whole sphere of the sciences into three fundamental groups, Locke proposed, on practically the last page of this work, two names for this third division. These were "Semeiotike," the Greek word from which we derive "Semantics" and "Doctrine of Signs." He considered this third division to be the equivalent of Logic, but its primary focus dealt with the analytic study of language. In agreement with this, he gave the title "Of Words" to one of the four extensive "books" in which he divided his complete work.

This precedent, more than any other close or distant instance, etched one of the most characteristic strokes of the whole movement of the philosophy of the understanding. This distinctive feature held the view that the most general part of grammar was not only by its nature a philosophical discipline, but it even was a privileged sector of philosophy. The summit of this approach began to be reached with Condillac and the publication of his so-called Philosophical Grammar.

Beginning as a philosophical disciple of Locke and Condillac, Bello continued his development within the spirit of this tradition. Both as a philosopher and a grammarian, Bello persisted until the end of his life as a stubborn cultivator of what Locke had called the "Doctrine of Signs." Certainly, this historical cornerstone which has served to nourish the flourishing of this movement to the present ought to be seen as having its roots in this concern of Locke about a theory of signs. This position does not intend either to underestimate the many prior contributions to this subject, or to ignore what has developed both by coincidence and through the different paths taken by semiotics and the philosophy of language in our own days.

In this field, Bello's theory of ideas-signs, with its broad epistemological and metaphysical implications, constituted the most personal of his contributions. In analyzing language, he found not only words or expressions that directly served as signs of present perceptions and ideas, or of renewed perceptions; he also recognized that words or expressions within their sphere of ideas function as signs in an indirect way. There is one kind of ideas which is translated naturally to words or expressions and which functions as signs of other ideas. These latter signs appear to convey meaning through verbal expressions in an indirect or secondary way. Those ideas which serve as meaningful intermediaries between ideas and the signs of language are themselves ideas-signs.

Contrary to the common assumption, Bello did not make his first reference to his notion of ideas-signs in his major philosophical treatise. His initial mention of ideas-signs occurred in 1841 in his work Análisis Ideológica de los Tiempos de la Conjugación Castellana. Menéndez y Pelayo stated that this work was "the most original and profound of his linguistic studies"; he praised its great benefit but not without stating that, "Yet, at first glance, it appears to be a work more metaphysical than practical" (82).

The fact is that the above work was prior not only to the Gramática de la Lengua Castellana, which appeared in 1847 and in which the former appears completely condensed, but also to the first partial publication of the Philosophy of the Understanding, in 1843. This circumstance illustrates the basic philological inspiration of Bello's philosophy together with the vertebral significance which his philosophy of language assumes.



Without analyzing here the diverse philosophical facets of the work of 1841, with all of what they already include explicitly of "the philosophy of the understanding" (83), let us remember that after dealing with the proper or direct use of the tenses of the verb, Bello undertakes what he will call its metaphorical use. That is, he will deal with the conventional use of some verb tenses in place of others. He does this in a part which he entitles "Metaphorical Values in Verbal Forms," which begins in this way: "The relative ideas of tense indicated by verbal forms can become signs of other ideas; the metaphor consists of what this is" (84).

Although the general doctrine of ideas-signs was not developed there, and it does not follow that it should have been, the notion of idea-sign itself already was well defined: an idea, the sign of another idea. The metaphor was one kind of idea-sign. To give form to that doctrine in Chapter XVI of the Philosophy of the Understanding, Bello would leave the metaphor circumscribed to only one of the three possible classes of ideas-signs which he called "homonyms, metaphors, and endogenieties." It does not appear forced to imagine that his initial reflection about the metaphorical use of the tenses of verbs led him to the concept that all metaphors are ideas-signs. From this view would develop in due time the position that metaphors are only one of the three classes of ideas-signs.

Before reaching that chapter, Bello had come more than once in his philosophical treatise to the notion and the expression of idea-sign. Thus the chapter begins: "I have pointed out by chance some ideas which in the understanding make instances of other ideas that are not given to us to form. I call these ideas-signs" (85).

All of the three mentioned classes which he establishes are based on relations of resemblance, but in each case they come to be a part of this relation in different ways. Homonyms are ideas-signs in which the object of the substitute idea is of the same species or name as that of the idea replaced. They become manifest each time that we come across the name of a class to represent to ourselves an object of that class which we have not observed. Metaphors are ideas-signs in which we represent to ourselves an object by means of the idea of another object of diverse species. But we well know that the sign of this diverse object is not applicable except by losing a part of its own meaning. Finally, endogenieties are ideas-signs which arise out of the depth of the signified idea. But it does not signify it other than through the partial representation of only one of its aspects. This operation is very frequent since we almost never represent to ourselves the whole of the objects about which we are thinking.

It is unnecessary to call attention to the problems that, in carrying out their details, establish Bello's theory of ideas-signs which are inseparable from those ideas-signs established by his theory of abstraction. Let us say here that, of the three groups pointed out, it is the metaphors which are the result of a paradoxical relation of "resemblance of differences" (86) and obviously comprise the most important group.

He gives twice as much space to metaphors as he gives to both of the other groups. But it serves his purpose to linger over what is proper or improper in abstraction in its relations to generalization as well as over the errors to which the bad use of metaphors, or their exaggeration, has led in the field of philosophy.

Meanwhile, metaphor is in its depth all the representation of our interior world: "The names which we give to the mental operations have been originally all metaphors, and it is almost impossible to talk of them if we do not take advantage of the words and phrases with which we tend to indicate the reciprocal actions of bodies." But the application of metaphor is more ample: "In general, we make it easier for ourselves and others to perceive less familiar objects by comparing them with others which we have had occasion to observe frequently." Thus, "From what is said, it follows that the same principle which leads us to the formation of classes and to the imposition of general names is what suggests metaphorical signs to us." And he adds: "It is possible to say that every general name has been originally a metaphor, and that every metaphor is an imperfect generalization" (87).

At the same time that metaphorical signs fulfill a vital function in language, they are a source of error. The use of metaphorical signs like the use of homonymous signs yields to "our propensity to attribute to the object what in reality only pertains to the sign. Although we have both of them present in the understanding and it is not possible to confuse them, many times it will happen that we take the analogy very far beyond what is proper" (88). In the history of philosophy, this has been the case with "the substantial forms of the peripatetic school" as well as with "so many erroneous concepts relative to space and time." The cases of the extreme sensationism of Condillac and the medical materialism of Cabanis also are closer to Bello's views, and he takes advantage of this circumstance to criticize them in some detail (89).

It is through the use of the notion of ideas-signs that Bello challenges the realist conception of space and time:

> We have a certain propensity to cloak as a real being or as a species of substance everything that is signified by a substantive [. . .]. For my part, I confess that I have not caught a glimpse of any true existence in these phantasmagoric appraisals of time and of space. Time in itself is for me a possible order of successive events just as space in itself is a possible order of coexistent events.

Insisting on the confessional emphasis in a highly expressive way, he concludes the passage in the following manner: "All of my efforts to find in them something of the real which my understanding could grasp have been in vain" (90).

In subsequent pages, he repeats what he had suggested about both ideas in this same passage, in a positive way. He says that, "Space and time are then mere capacities of real existences" (91). For this reason, he previously had found "plausible the idea of Kant which sees space and time as correlatives to the human intelligence" (92). But he is nearer to Leibniz than to Kant. It is not as a priori forms that he understands space and time, although he might appear to suggest it in this place.



Rather, space and time are metaphorical ideas-signs which begin with perceptions of relations that are resultants of the psychological abstract process proper to ideas-signs.

Sometimes the scope of this affinity with Kant has been overestimated. After Bello remembered that Leibniz denied the reality of space and time, "reducing them, as we ourselves have done, to mere abstractions or ideas," Bello added, from his psychologist point of view, that he was not certain about Leibniz's own view. "Kant was thinking in a similar manner when he made space and time a priori conditions to all our empirical knowledge." But he makes clear that

> If one takes a close look, it is clear there is no more difference between a priori conditions and relations of succession than that stemming from language itself. As we have seen, such a priori conditions belong to the concept of both space and time; and the mind also engenders the relations of succession by virtue of activity appropriate to it. For in the first expression [a priori conditions], language is synthetic, and in the second [relations of succession], language is analytic (93).

It is unnecessary to reiterate which were the concepts and language to which Bello was devoted personally.

Even though the ideas of time and space are necessary, the error is in ontologizing or substantiating them. Anyone falling into this error usually commits himself to a similar error with two other ideas, those of nothing and the infinite, which are equally indispensable for the understanding.

Inherently opposed in themselves, both have in common the deriving of space and time from such ideas or names. Just as nothing can not be a cause of intuitions or of sensations, we can not have any idea of nothing in the proper sense: "It is necessary that in the place of this idea that we do not have, nor are we able to have, there should be something in the understanding, that is, an idea-sign, which provides for it and which in a given way would account for its instances." With regard to the infinite as differentiated from the finite, it can not be perceived through the human intelligence which is restricted by force to objects with limits: "Consequently, the idea which we have of the infinite is an idea-sign and it can not be any other thing" (94). The error is in carrying to extremes the belief, attributing the status of a real entity to nothing and to the infinite, which in themselves are necessary as ideas.

The notion of idea-sign alludes to the understanding through the aspect of "idea," and to language through the aspect of "sign." Its theory is the central part of what there is regarding the philosophy of language in the treatise of Bello about the understanding. But it is the single central part. A careful examination of this work shows that the relation between understanding and language, between thought and language, is present from the beginning to the end of the treatise. The analysis of these relations even constitutes the fundamental motivation of the primary grammatical works of the author.

Already in the prologue to the Análisis Ideológica de los Tiempos de la Conjugación Castellana of 1841, a work about the tenses of the verb, Bello had recommended that more attention be paid "to what occurs in the understanding when we speak." This emphasizes the importance for the understanding of what he calls "the philosophical study of language." In this instance, it was conveying that the principles he was going to establish about Spanish conjugation would become "applicable with certain modifications to other languages" (95). In the prologue to the Gramática de la Lengua Castellana of 1847, he insists on this basic idea: "Without doubt, the signs of thought obey certain general laws, which, derived from those laws to which thought itself is subject, dominate all languages and constitute a universal grammar" (96).

Language in the above view has its general laws which are derived from those that are, at the same time, the general laws of thought. But Bello immediately makes two reservations. On the one hand, beneath what different languages have in common, there are great differences between them. These language differences give rise to the importance of particular or national grammars which have their base in philosophical or general grammar. On the other hand, thought and language are not to be identified with each other.

This latter reservation, that of not identifying thought with language, is particularly important to us in this context. Bello stated in the same aforesaid prologue:

> Let us not then transfer lightly the troubles of ideas to the accidents of words. The assumption that language is an exact likeness of thought has brought about not a few mistakes in philosophy. And this same exaggerated assumption has led grammar astray in the opposite direction.

The mistaken assumption of such identity which is brought about through exaggeration has made philosophy and grammar to err in a parallel way, with each one going astray in its own manner. "In language, the conventional and arbitrary includes much more than what commonly is thought" (97).

As we have seen already, it was in 1843-44, during the precise chronological interval between these grammatical works of 1841 and 1847, that Bello published at least the first part of the Philosophy of the Understanding. In Bello's case, it is well understood up to what point the reflection about the relations between thought and language were in fact inseparable in the conscience and in the work of the grammarian and of the philosopher.

It is curious that it is precisely at reaching Chapter XX that the same notions of language and of sign appear organically for the first time. This occurs under the disorienting chapter title "Of the Suggestion of Recollections," a subject approached in analyzing the function of the psychological phenomena of the association of ideas. Having made the inevitable distinction between natural signs and artificial signs, between natural language and artificial language, Bello begins to study even there the problem of writing. He then incorporates extensively into the text an older text, written in 1827, during his London period,



and published in El Repertorio Americano with the title of "Bosquejo del Origen y Progresos del Arte de Escribir" (98). He was advancing there, as he continued to do now, a reference to the rudimentary "analysis of thought by means of speech" (98), which primitive man already achieves in a spontaneous way through the sole act of elaborating and utilizing language.

But from the first chapters of the work and well before reaching Chapter XX, the relation between thought and language is present. And his interest in the relation will continue to be active until the end of the treatise.

Since perception is psychologically prior to speech, Bello places the topic of perception without hesitation prior to the problem of language. In Chapter IV of this study, we emphasize the significance that perceptions of relation, or of "relatives," as Bello also calls them, have in his philosophy. These relations are on a secondary level with regard to a first level which consists in the original perceptions that sometimes are intuitive and at other times sensory, the latter divided, in turn, into internal and external perceptions. In the area of the perceptions of relation, which can lead to the concept of the relation of relations, the first to which Bello pays attention is the relations of resemblance because of their psychological priority. Inseparable from these relations of resemblance, but subordinate to them, are the perceptions of the relation of difference. Thus, the origin of language is found in perceptions of the relation of resemblance.

Bello understands that resemblance is not the properly stated perception of what there is in common in objects (99). But, indeed, it is the source of common names, and through them, of language:

> The perception of resemblance is what has given rise to the general designations with which we designate objects, and through the means of such names, they have become arranged in mental collections which we call classes, genera, and species. This only shows the basic role which resemblance ought to have played in the formation of language.

He makes explicit the following point:

> Since it is impossible to give a proper name to each one of the objects which we know, there was an instinctive recourse to the choice of imposing on them general designations, that is, common names or appelatives, which all are one according to the resemblances which we observed in them (100).

Yet further on, where Bello was closing a fundamental passage about the psychological phenomenon of generalization, he states that, "It also follows from what is said that generalization, or the intellectual procedure with which we form general ideas, is reduced to perceiving resemblances and to imposing common designations on resembling individuals" (101). And yet much further along, he states that, "In this way, there is formed the nominal classification of objects, the base of the systems of meaning which we call speech or languages" (102).

The perception of resemblance is a perception of qualities. Perception gives in thought the qualities or modes of being of objects as such. In language, these qualities correspond to predicates: "We call what we perceive qualities of objects and we call the signs with which we represent them in language attributes or predicates." The following conclusion appears obvious to him: "It is easy to begin seeing that between qualities and attributes there is not the correlation or parallelism which many philosophers have imagined [. . .]. It is to confuse the understanding with language, the qualities with attributes." Accompanying this erroneous concept is the false belief that "to the separation of signs in language there corresponds an equal separation of ideas in the understanding" (103).

The awareness of such confusions, like the precautions which one must take to avoid them, can not make one forget the essential relation or correlation between understanding and language, between the general laws of thought and the also general laws of language. This is what culminated in his theory of ideas-signs, with the resulting distinction between what is legitimate or illegitimate in the philosophical or ordinary use of names which designate such ideas-signs.

## VIII. Logical Psychologism

The division of Logic in the Philosophy of the Understanding does not avoid the typical metaphysical tone of the section on Psychology. In order to complement the primary leading notions of first philosophy illustrated in the section on Psychology, we expect to come upon different passages about it in the division on Logic. And so, his first chapter deals with "Of Knowledge" in a period in which the theory of knowledge was advancing toward its autonomy. In developing Bello's logical psychologism, this chapter also will have to deal with his metaphysics, psychology, and logic.

In 1843, the same year that a part of Bello's treatise first appeared in a newspaper in Chile, John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic appeared in London. Although in many different senses Mill's work was highly innovative particularly in the area of induction, it still kept the grammatical or "grammaticalist" tradition of the preceding movement. Mill's first division has the title "Of Names and Propositions," with the heading of its first chapter, "Of the Necessity of Commencing with an Analysis of Language." Approaching logic as the art of proof, Mill finds such problems as "What are the facts which are the objects of intuition or consciousness, and what are those which we merely infer?" to be foreign to his subject. Instead of following this kind of approach with which, as we have seen, Bello deals extensively in his Psychology, Mill treats such topics differently. He states that

> Its place is in another and perfectly distinct department of science, to which the name metaphysics more particularly belongs: that portion of mental philosophy which attempts to determine what part of the furniture of the mind belongs to it originally, and what part is constructed out of materials furnished to it from without (104).

Published almost simultaneously with Mill's work was another Logic



which became the most important book of that period in French eclectic spiritualism. This work supported--like Bello--introducing the subject of knowledge at the beginning of a book on this topic. We refer to the division on logic of Jules Simon, in the 1845 first edition of the historical Manual of Philosophy of Jacques, Simon, and Saisset. All of the various chapters in the first part of the two sections on logic deal with issues about knowledge in a way that, beginning with neo-Kantianism, became differentiated from logic and developed under the subject heading of the theory of knowledge or of epistemology.

Although we lack the exact date of when Bello worked out the details of his Logic, it obviously was during the decade of the 1840's. It should be emphasized that by that time he had assimilated the prevailing emergent tendency to give the subject of knowledge, based on logic in the proper sense, a place in the systematization of philosophy. At this point, it is not important that as yet epistemology still remains as a part of his Logic. The movement of the Anglo-French philosophy of the understanding to which Bello belonged was competing as much in the philosophical world of that period as was the Kantian transcendental enthroned philosophy from Germany.

After the issue of knowledge, the primary introductory subject of Bello's Logic will be judgment. At the beginning of the Psychology, he wrote that "the ideas which accompany the well-founded judgment about the reality of the objects are called knowledge." Now he will add that

> There is a certain difference between knowledge and judgment. Knowledge is the power which the soul has to renew a judgment. [. . .] Knowledge is the possession and judgment is the use. And in the same way that possession always begins by occupation, knowledge begins in all instances by judgment (105).

José Gaos observed that, without doubt, the lack of a prior doctrine of concepts was consistent with tradition and was due to the historical situation in which concepts continued to be a subject studied in psychology, "when psychology studied ideas" (106). Nothing is more illustrative of the psychologist base of all Bello's Logic, that is, of his logical psychologism. He himself establishes it in an expressed way in a chapter in his Logic. In setting out in detail the proper psychological bases of ontology, he links more than once logic with psychology. About this matter he states:

> It refers to finding out what general ideas are [. . .]. It is what traces the limits of the intuition and of the senses, the only perceptive faculties of man [. . .]. It is what discovers in the depths of thought the primary elements of reason and the eternal types of reasoning (107).

Yet, Bello is more explicit in another passage in the same Logic where, with regard to the use of the syllogism, he says in passing:

> Given the statement, "From the consequence that every principle ought to explain itself on the basis of the original principle," it follows that "all of the philosophical notions which are psychological ought to explain themselves on the basis of psychological no-

tions." The basis for this influence is that the subterm philosophical notions is included, with respect to psychology, in the subterm consequences, and the subterm psychological notions with respect to all other philosophical notions is included in the subterm principles (108).

There is then a rigorous logical order: principles, psychological notions, and all the remaining philosophical notions. But there is the following exception. Through psychological analysis guided by certain instincts or principles, there is agreement to those principles which are discovered through the royal road of psychology: "All are disclosed in the natural movement of the imagination" (109). It is what we previously saw in our Chapter VI, in pointing to the empirical base set up by Bello for those primary principles inherent in the human reason. Obviously, perception will continue to be in logic, as it was in psychology, the primary phenomenon of reference. Let us remember the universality which he granted to the perceptive psychological method in the whole sphere of philosophy:

> The psychological method always has been known in philosophy and there can not be philosophy without it. Locke, Berkeley, Reid, Dugald Stewart looked at perceptions of conscience as the source of all knowledge which the soul can have of itself (110).

In the case of judgments, the decisive perception is that of relations: "The soul is not able to affirm or to deny anything else than relations" (111). From this it follows that "Judgments, according to what has been said, assume ideas among which we perceive relations" (112). But in agreement with the doctrine developed by Bello throughout all his work, it is fitting to distinguish with due care between proper ideas and improper ideas. That is, there is need to distinguish between the renewed perceptions and the representations about which in actuality we do not have perceptions, nor can we have. But yet they act as ideas which intervene in the relations about which judgments consist. Already we know what these last ideas are; they are ideas-signs. It is with regard to judgments in his complete Logic that Bello reiterates the following:

> There are ideas which accurately represent objects by means of renovated perceptions. But there are objects which we represent to ourselves by means of other ideas which serve us as signs or images and which make the occasions for proper ideas which we lack. [. . .] By means of these ideas-signs and of only the assumed natural possibility of the imagination, the soul rises to the ideas of entity in general, of possibility, and of the infinite (113).

In the problem of the relation between thought and language, Bello makes the above analysis to be fruitful for his logic, as it had been for his psychology. Meanwhile, the notion of judgment naturally leads him to consider the subject of propositions. And again he defends his favorite bipartisan conception of them, as he also does in his grammatical works. Although "the logicians" divide propositions into three elements, subject, predicate, and copula, "it is much more simple and exact to consider propositions as having only two elements, the subject and the attribute" (114). The notion of proposition takes him in due course



to the notion of definition. Here, he again separates himself from "the logicians," for whom there are only two kinds, "definition of things and definition of names." On his part, he understands that there are three kinds: "definition of things, definition of ideas, and definition of names" (115).

In this way, he advances in depth into the variety of definitions which grammarians give to different words by making reference to substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. His conclusion is that, "Actually, the various classes of words do not differ from each other by their meaning, but rather by their connection and mutual dependence on language." As a result, he completes his views about definitions by expressing his concern about avoiding merely verbal disputes:

> At the same time, each definition is a definition of a thing, of an idea, and of a word; and it depends only upon the circumstances in which we seek to make known an object through the use of a definition, to express a special new concept, or to settle the meaning of an ambiguous word.

Yet, he wants to go to the base of the problem and he comments further about this issue: "Each of these purposes of definitions always is limited to determining an object since every word signifies an idea and every idea corresponds to an object" (116).

It is to be expected that in the final chapter, "Of the Causes of Error," the same problem of the relation between the thought and its signs reappears, although in this case the presentation is not well organized. Of the seven causes which he enumerates, one is the abuse of ideas-signs and another is the general imperfection of language. On the other hand, "The ideas-signs deceive us [when we exaggerate them], making us attribute to the object meaning which only pertains to its image." On the other hand,

> The dangers of error in the use of words consist: in that we have not formed an exact and precise concept of their meaning as they generally are understood [. . .] in that many words have various meanings, among which there are great similarities [. . .] in the complexity of the meaning of many words.

But one and another cause of error tend to coincide: "The abuse of words coincides in part with that of ideas-signs, because whenever we exaggerate the value of one of the ideas-signs, we alter the meaning of the word which represents it" (117).

In agreement with all that has been said, the nominalism which was characteristic of Bello's Psychology together with the three other fundamental theses which have special metaphysical significance, spiritualism, theism, and idealism, unfold coherently in his Logic. The logical developments give him the opportunity to enter easily and willingly into this area through his selection of examples.

Bello makes various statements about the substantial self:

Given a modification, when a phenomenon is perceived, we find it

impossible to stop assuming a substantial self as a support, a subject, a substance, a modified being. Having perceived intuitively in ourselves the substantial self, we make it an image, an idea-sign of all the other substances. [. . .] We know, through the strongest of all analogical combinations, the existence of other human spirits (118).

With regard to the relation of God to nature, he states that, "The Creator has been able to elect at his discretion between these or those laws, and the election which has taken place is a fact, or better, a class of facts which we can reach only in an a posteriori way" (119).

Bello thus reaffirms his spiritualism and his theism in a way that gave him great satisfaction. Yet, he does this in his defense of the idealistic conception of the exterior world and almost always during an opportunity to engage in his excelling polemics about this subject with the Scottish school of common sense. In opposition to Stewart, he points out that, "We have proved that the theory of Berkeley does not present anything absurd except for those who have not paused to examine it." And in opposing Reid, he asserts that, "[. . .] to his despair, our notions of corporeal objects can not be anything other than symbolic representations which only have resemblances of relations with their causes, and they do not tell us, nor can they tell us, anything about the nature and the absolute qualities of these causes" (120).

In its strict methodological features, Bello's Logic corresponds in doctrine to the period immediately preceding that of John Stuart Mill, whose work in the philosophy of induction had a strong influence on renovating and increasing interest in the subject and on providing a direction followed by many subsequent investigators. The enormous development achieved in the physical sciences brought about a predominating interest that would concentrate, during the first third of the nineteenth century, on the inductive method, with its abundant and diversified practical application. Yet in the essential elements of its basic theories, induction was still a legatee of Bacon. The culmination of the speculations which stirred during this period was the work of the Englishman in his historic A System of Logic of 1843. At the same time, it was a point of departure for new investigations and penetrating inquiries.

In an expressed way, Bello recognized in his work his debt to three significant authors in the decade of the 1830's in this field. One of these persons was John Herschel, for his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, published in 1831. Another was William Whewell, for his History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time, of 1837, and for his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon Their History, of 1840. These two extensive works have served as complementary sections of one primary work. The third author was Auguste Comte for his Course of Positive Philosophy, of 1830 to 1842.

As Mill explains in his Autobiography, his first primary inspiration had as its basis the work of Herschel. From the moment of its appearance, Herschel's work was highly influential. It filled an existing vacuum and became for a number of years a binding authority in the field.



The two great works of Whewell, which became a great challenge for Mill, appreciably surpassed the work of Herschel. In going beyond Comte in the philosophy of induction, Mill's work, with sound justification, closed one period and opened another in the history of logic.

When Bello begins his development of the method of investigation in the sciences of nature, he does not find his support in Mill, even though Mill may have prolonged significantly the same tradition of logical psychologism. Bello finds such support in Herschel, whom he mentions in acknowledging, "To whom I owe the material of this chapter." He also calls Herschel's Discourse, "a classical work which is like a catechism of logic for the study of the physical sciences" (121).

The master scholar José Gaos, in his 1948 Introduction to Bello's Philosophy of the Understanding, stated that "the contributions of the Logic of Mill are not transparent" among the circumstances from which Bello develops the method of the natural sciences. Rather, according to Gaos, in calling the work of Herschel "classic," Bello is responding "to the situation of 'classicalness,' if you will permit me the expression, immediately prior to the appearance of the work of Mill." Such evidence appears to be "conclusive proof that the work did not come to the knowledge of Bello in time to influence his own work" (122). In a previous work, we believe that we have clarified everything that has been assumed about the reiterated belief that John Stuart Mill, whom Bello knew as a child in the London home of John Stuart's father, James Mill, exercised influence through his Logic on the philosophical and grammatical thought of the native of Caracas (123).

The previous references serve to give precision to the historico-doctrinal characterization not only of the section on Bello's Logic, but also of all of the Philosophy of the Understanding, as representative of the period which preceded the invasion of positivism in Latin America, even though the publication of Bello's treatise did not occur in complete form until a much later date.

## IX. "Philosophy of the Understanding" in Latin American Philosophy

From the point of view of languages, Latin American philosophy passes through two great periods. In the colonial period, the use of Latin was proper, yet there still were some later uses of it. In the modern period, which began with the movements for independence, the national languages are proper although the use of Latin was not discontinued completely.

The first period, which was dominated by a scholasticism that finally was dismantled for modern philosophy, included at all times distinguished peninsular and national representatives. Among these were the Hispanic-Mexican friar Alonso de la Vera Cruz in the first half of the sixteenth century, the Chilean Alfonso Briceño in the seventeenth century, and the Cuban José Agustín Caballero at the end of the eighteenth century. Let us remember that in their day scarcely a minimum number of these intellectuals had access to a printing press. By giving equal attention to published materials and including Cuba, which remained politically dependent until the end of the last century, the second period also had,

from the beginning of the nineteenth century in the era prior to positivism, a succession of notable intellectuals influenced by the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Among those in this group were the Cuban Félix Varela, the Hispanic-Argentine Juan Manuel Fernández de Agüero, the Cuban José de la Luz y Caballero, and Andrés Bello.

The master Francisco Romero made famous the classification of the "founders of the Latin American philosophy" referring to the great intellectuals of the 1800's. These men, who both inherited positivism and went beyond it, carried out the major part of their work in the first decades of the twentieth century. Yet, Romero, in retrospective vision, sometimes considered that certain outstanding positivist thinkers and their predecessors, whom we previously mentioned from the first half of the past century, also belong to the "team of those which deserve to be called the founders." Among these, he recalled Bello in the forefront (124).

Upon the publishing of the Philosophy of the Understanding for the first time in 1881, the writer of the Prologue, the ecclesiastic F. Escobar Palma, notwithstanding the severe doctrinal criticism which motivated him, said of the work: "For its importance and in its class, it is the first which has been published in Chile and even in all America." Menéndez y Pelayo supported such a view in his already quoted judgment of 1893: "It is without doubt the most important work which American literature possesses in its class" (125). Both judgments continue in effect within the limits of the century to which they belong.

In the purifying and objective perspective of time, without taking sides in any dispute based on the long colonial cycle of the use of Latin and without prejudice to so many valuable advances of precursors in the area of national languages, the Philosophy of the Understanding increasingly takes on the character of the truly founding work of Latin American philosophy in its sector of the Spanish language. And Bello, as its representative, also stands truly as founder.

NOTES

1. By way of example, as a jurist he was an internationalist, a scholar of civil and of Roman law; as a philologist, in the broad sense, he was a grammarian, a linguist, a Latinist, a medievalist, etc.

2. All of this is without prejudice to the habitual as well as justified appeal to very generic conceptions such as those of humanist, man of letters, publicist, journalist (with regard to this last category, there were no writings of his, from his best poetry to his best philosophy, that did not have some journalistic manifestation), etc.

3. José Enrique Rodó, Obras Completas, edited by Emir Rodríguez Monegal (Madrid: Aguilar, 1967), p. 868.

4. These titles could be reduced if the first two were joined together as "Silvas Americanas," by which title Bello originally announced them. In the first phase of their composition, he even intended them to form only one great poem titled "América." But not only were they published separately at different times, but from the beginning each poem expressed its own individuality, through concurrent but not coincidental aesthetic values, in the Hispanic-American literary tradition. With regard to the others, it is suitable to point out the following: (1) Principios de Derecho Internacional is the title that Bello gave to replace the title of an earlier work, "Principios de Derecho de Gentes," after the publication of the first two editions



in 1832 and 1844. (2) The Código Civil of the Republic of Chile in its essentials is a very personal work of Bello. Officially, it was published for the first time in 1856, the year following its approval; but since the previous decade, Bello had been announcing various "Projects" of it. (3) Filosofía del Entendimiento, a posthumous title, was published complete for the first time in 1881, as volume I of the edition of the Obras Completas of Bello, undertaken in that year by the University of Chile. These observations should clarify the meaning of the literal forms and the chronology of the titles recorded in the text.

5. As an example, in his Prologue to Borradores de Poesía, volume II of the Caracas edition of Obras Completas of Bello, 1962, Father Pedro P. Barnola, S.J., says:

> We can affirm that the drafts which we are now to analyze and comment upon constitute a substantial part of the most valuable and important material of what corresponds to the poetic works of Bello. And the reason is very clear. Because we know that the "Silvas" Alocución a la Poesía and La Agricultura de la Zona Tórrida are the best works which the hand from Caracas wrote as an original poet (p. XIV).

6. Quoted by Pedro Grases and Pedro P. Barnola in the volume Silva a la Agricultura de la Zona Tórrida, edited by J. J. Castro and Associates (Caracas, 1976), pp. 13, 144, and 133 note.

7. Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, Antología de Poetas Hispano-Americanos, volume II (Madrid, 1893), pp. CXXIII and ff.

8. José Gaos, "Introducción" to Andrés Bello, Filosofía del Entendimiento (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1948), p. LXXXIII.

9. They are found compiled following Filosofía del Entendimiento in the Andrés Bello volume, Filosofía, volume III of his Obras Completas (Caracas, 1951), pp. 345-695. Some of them had been included by Bello himself in 1850, in the volume in which he collected his works about different matters under the title of Opúsculos Literarios y Críticos Publicados en Diversos Periódicos desde el Año 1810 hasta 1832 (Santiago, Chile). All subsequent references to Bello's Obras Completas are to the edition cited in this note.

10. Juan David García Bacca, "Introducción General a las Obras Filosóficas de Andrés Bello," which appears as the prologue to Andrés Bello, Filosofía, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. XXIX.

11. With respect to the first, José Gaos has observed: "One of the sources of his [philosophical] originality is his gifts, education, and erudition as a philologist, in the widest sense of this expression" (loc. cit., supra note 8, p. LXXXIII). With regard to the second, Amado Alonso also has observed: "[. . .] in his Philosophy of the Understanding, free from the didactic responsibility [of grammar] and of its simplifications, he deals on a theoretical basis with various problems of language which have repercussions on his grammatical notions" (Introduction to Gramática, volume IV of his Obras Completas, p. LXXXIII).

12. See: Andrés Bello, "Juicio sobre las Obras Poéticas de Don Nicasio Alvarez de Cienfuegos," in the review La Biblioteca Americana (London, 1823), pp. 42-63. There is a facsimile reproduction of this journal (Caracas, 1972), Prologue by Rafael Caldera and indices by Pedro Grases.

13. See loc. cit., supra note 7, p. CXXIII.

14. Andrés Bello, Filosofía, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 508.

15. Ibid., pp. 578-579.

16. Apart from the title of the treatise, see, for example, in the edition of the same included in Ibid., as stated in supra note 9: pp. 23, 37, 388, 504.

17. Ibid., p. 582.

18. Ibid., p. 6.

19. Ibid., p. 3.

20. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 128. (Ensayo sobre el Entendimiento Humano, Spanish translation by Edmundo O'Gorman, [México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956], p. 108).

21. George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, edited by Philip Wheelwright (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1935), p. 36. (Tratado sobre los Principios del Conocimiento Humano, Spanish translation by Kisieri Frondizi [Buenos Aires: Losada, 1939], p. 62).

32. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 6.

33. Ibid., p. 7.

34. A. Jacques, J. Simon, E. Saisset, Manuel de Filosofía, first part, Psicología, in charge of A. Jacques, chapter II, paragraph 2. To the coincidence of the dates of the treatises on Psychology of Bello and of Jacques, there would be added, subsequently, the biographical coincidence of the death of both in the same year, 1861, in the same southern latitude, in Santiago and Buenos Aires, respectively. The French master immigrated to the River Plate after the fall of the Second Republic; he was twenty-two years younger than Bello. At that time, they probably were the two most illustrious philosophers of Latin America.

35. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, pp. 80, 88. Secondarily, he referred to its connections with the will when he became concerned with the problem of attention. (See, especially, ibid., pp. 249-256.) Bello's articles of 1848-1849 concerning the Curso de Filosofía of Bartier of 1844-1845, evidently were later than the corresponding passages in his treatise. In a very well known way, Bello divides the affective life between the perceptive order of the understanding and the active order of the will. But he does not reach the point of conceiving the affective life as a third class of psychic phenomena. (Ibid., pp. 467 and ff., and 476 and ff.).

36. Condillac, Oeuvres Philosophiques, edition of George Le Roy (Paris, 1947), volume I, pp. 2, 619.

37. M. Menéndez y Pelayo, loc. cit., supra note 7.

38. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 7. (The third and last underlinings in the quoted passage are ours.)

39. Ibid., p. 445.

40. Ibid., p. 460.

41. Ibid., p. 468.

42. Ibid., pp. 460-461.

43. Ibid., p. 568.

44. Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), pp. 1331 and ff.

45. The underlining in the quotations of Bello is ours. Concerning Bello's view of the relation of grammatical thought to metaphysics, together with the inclusion of these and other quotations from his works, see our "La Iniciación Filosófica de Bello" in the volume Bello y Caracas (Caracas: Fundación La Casa de Bello, 1979), pp. 319-334.

46. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 35.

47. Ibid., p. 33.

48. Ibid., pp. 34-35. See also pp. 113-119, Chapter VII, "De la Relación de Identidad-Sustancialidad."

49. Ibid., pp. 238, 166-167, 221 note.

50. Ibid., p. 67. It is interesting to show how in his cited though later article, in which he discusses the views of Bartier and continues within the same conceptualization, he complements the terminology referring to the distinction between intuitive perceptions and sensitive perceptions: "We believe that we express their different nature by calling the one group intuitive, direct; and the others, sensitive, representative, indirect." (Ibid., p. 468).

51. Ibid., pp. 31, 37.

52. Ibid., pp. 66, 74.

53. Ibid., p. 126.

54. Ibid., p. 131.

55. Ibid., pp. 129, 137 and ff. Forgetting that its origin was in Reid, intellectuals to our day have continued to discuss a difficulty or objection which philosophers subsequent to



Reid also adopted. Bello already had considered and rebutted effectively this difficulty in dealing with problems reflected in his more penetrating analysis of the doctrine of causality. In this respect, Bello summarizes the view of Reid: "If causality, Reid says, was not more than a constant succession, one would look at night as the cause of day, and day as the cause of night." Bello responds: "This argument is based on a twisted intelligence in that prior phenomena in constant succession is claimed to constitute causality." And at the end of a reasoned argument which we have to omit, Bello concludes that from the point of view of causal relations, the actual "antecedent phenomenon" of the day is not night but the presence of the sun, just as that of night, is not day but the absence of the sun. The appearance and the disappearance of the sun sharply breaks the assumed circularity between day and night, by breaking in a strict sense their contiguity. (Ibid., pp. 130-139).

56. Ibid., p. 135.

57. Ibid., p. 136.

58. Ibid., p. 334.

59. Ibid., pp. 642, 643.

60. Typical of this meaning is the following passage from Feijoo, which is selected from many other similar ones in his writings:

> For my part, I protest that if in this situation only philosophical and mathematical reasons were considered, I would be the purest Copernican in the world. But the bad part is that after one investigates thoroughly all that there is of philosophy and mathematics in the matter, there remains a highly superior argument against Copernicus [. . .] that which is taken from the authority of the Scriptures. (Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, Cartas Eruditas, vol. III, letter XX, paragraph 24).

61. See the complete text of the letter in M. L. Amunátegui, Vida de Don Andrés Bello (Santiago, Chile, 1882), pp. 142-143.

62. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, pp. 12, 25, 34-35.

63. Ibid., p. 219.

64. Ibid., p. 466.

65. Ibid., pp. 292, 370-371.

66. Ibid., p. 314.

67. Ibid., pp. 284-285.

68. Ibid., p. 637.

69. George Berkeley, op. cit., p. 23.

70. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 34. (The underlining is ours.)

71. Ibid., pp. 13, 28.

72. Ibid., p. 111.

73. In chapter V of his Logic, devoted to "the abstract and general ideas," Condillac had said: "What is in the depth the reality that a general and an abstract idea has in our spirit? It is no more than a name; or if it is any other thing, it ceases necessarily to be abstract and general."

74. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 238.

75. Ibid., p. 248.

76. Ibid., pp. 247, 248.

77. Ibid., p. 267.

78. George Berkeley: "[. . .] I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract general ideas [. . .]. We have, I think, shown the impossibility of abstract ideas" (Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, pp. 14, 21). (Op. cit., pp. 17, 361.

69. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, pp. 270-271.

70. Ibid., p. 271.

71. Ibid., p. 272.

72. Ibid., p. 269.

73. Ibid., pp. 268-270.

74. Ibid., pp. 628-629.

75. Ibid., p. 624.

76. Ibid., p. 370.

77. Ibid., pp. 377-380.

78. Ibid., pp. 382-383.

79. Ibid., p. 378.

80. Ibid., p. 147.

81. Ibid., pp. 126, 132-133, 143-144, 222.

82. M. Menéndez y Pelayo, loc. cit., supra note 7.

83. On this material, we are referring to our study cited, supra note 35.

84. Andrés Bello, Análisis Ideológica de los Tiempos de la Conjugación Castellana, paragraph no. 113.

85. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 156.

86. Ibid., p. 265.

87. Ibid., pp. 261-262.

88. Ibid., pp. 268, 285-289, 263-264. Concerning ideas-signs as causes of error, with a distinct range according to each one of his three clauses, he returned to them in the part of Logic of his treatise: Ibid., pp. 332-333.

89. Ibid., pp. 268, 263-266.

90. Ibid., p. 187.

91. Ibid., p. 190.

92. Ibid., p. 184.

93. Ibid., p. 198.

94. Ibid., pp. 253-255.

95. Andrés Bello, Prologue to Análisis Ideológica de los Tiempos de la Conjugación Castellana, pp. II, IV.

96. Andrés Bello, volume IV of his Obras Completas, Prologue to his Gramática de la Lengua Castellana, p. 7.

97. Ibid., pp. 7, 3-4.

98. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 322. In this volume, the reproduction of the London article extends from page 319, line 9, to page 327, line 28. This passage corresponds to pages 11-21 of the cited place in El Repertorio Americano, where this article begins on page 11 and continues until page 25. Finally, we wish to indicate that the same London article is collected in volume XIX of his Obras Completas.

99. Ibid., pp. 88 and ff.



100. Ibid., p. 92.

101. Ibid., pp. 235-236.

102. Ibid., p. 316.

103. Ibid., pp. 95, 243, 344.

104. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1868), p. 4. (Sistema de Lógica, Spanish translation by Eduardo Ovejero y Maury [Madrid, 1917], p. 15).

105. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, pp. 24, 267- 268.

106. José Gaos, loc. cit., supra note 8, p. LXXII.

107. Andrés Bello, volume III of his Obras Completas, p. 460.

108. Ibid., p. 444.

109. Ibid., p. 377.

110. Ibid., p. 588.

111. Ibid., p. 397.

112. Ibid., p. 388.

113. Ibid., pp. 399-400.

114. Ibid., p. 401.

115. Ibid., p. 414.

116. Ibid., pp. 417, 418-419.

117. Ibid., pp. 522, 532, 533. In the strictly last paragraph to the whole work, he thinks that the following reservation is in order: "In the abuse both of ideas-signs and of words, there also are causes of error which can appear repetitious and can be considered as the same error but under different names, as in the case of a vicious circle and in begging the question." (Ibid., p. 543).

118. Ibid., pp. 380-486.

119. Ibid., p. 385.

120. Ibid., pp. 394, 538-539.

121. Ibid., pp. 515-516.

122. José Gaos, loc. cit., supra note 8, pp. XLVIII-XLIX.

123. This study was presented at the Congress "Bello and Chile" with the title "La Relación de Bello con Stuart Mill" (Caracas: Fundación La Casa de Bello, 1980).

124. Francisco Romero, Sobre la Filosofía en América (Buenos Aires, 1952), p. 13.

125. P. Escobar Salom, Prologue to the first edition of Filosofía del Entendimiento (Santiago, Chile, 1881), p. XVII; M. Menéndez y Pelayo, loc. cit., supra note 7, p. CXXIII.